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 ABSTRACT 
The Right to No Longer Be a Refugee: The Legal Empowerment of Syrian Refugees in Jordan 
Rachel Mayer 
 
The now-protracted Syrian refugee crisis has become the largest global refugee crisis since 
World War II. Although often discussed in terms of the European migration crisis, this crisis has 
had a far greater impact on the neighboring host countries, which have been overwhelmed by 
massive influxes of Syrian refugees since the onset of the crisis in Syria. Moreover, these 
generous host countries have not received nearly enough support from the international 
community to cope with the crisis. Consequently, these countries have placed more and more 
restrictions on Syrian refugees. Syrian refugees in Jordan are marginalized and are not afforded 
basic rights like the right to work. As humanitarian aid has been consistently underfunded, and 
Syrian refugees’ savings have dried up, many Syrian refugees are no longer able to cope.  
Herein I examine the case of the Syrian refugees in Jordan. I focus on legal status of Syrian 
refugees in Jordan through a human rights lens, bearing in mind the economics and security 
perspectives. I use the noted observations and interviews with Jordanian nationals, Syrian 
refugees, and staff from various UN agencies, IGOs and INGOs, and local NGOs obtained 
during my fieldwork in Jordan in March 2016 in addition to archival material, reports, and other 
publically available secondary sources. I conclude that Jordan is obligated to ensure the 
protection of these Syrian refugees’ human rights (including both civil and political and social, 
economic, and cultural rights) regardless of how the refugee influx has impacted its economy, 
infrastructure, and national security. Furthermore, it is in Jordan’s economic and national 
security interests to integrate the Syrian refugees not just economically but legally by providing 
them with a pathway to citizenship. 
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All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
IDPs    Internally Displaced Persons 
IFRC    The International Federation of the Red Cross 
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IGOs    Intergovernmental Organizations 
IHL    International Humanitarian Law 
IHRL    International Human Rights Law 
ILO    The International Labor Organization 
IMC    The International Medical Corps 
IMCC     Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee 
IMF    International Monetary Fund 
INGOs    International Nongovernmental Organizations 
IOM    The International Organization for Migration 
IRAP The International Refugee Assistance Project (formerly The Iraqi 
Refugee Assistance Project) 
IRC    The International Rescue Committee 
IRD    International Relief and Development  
IRW    Islamic Relief Worldwide 
JAF    The Jordanian Armed Forces 
JAH     Jordan Affordable Housing Project 
JESSRP    Jordan Emergency Services and Social Resilience Program 
JHCO    Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization  
JOHUD   The Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development 
JRF    The Jordan River Foundation 
JRP or JRPSC    Jordan Response Platform to the Syria Crisis 
JRS    Jesuit Refugee Service 
LED     Local Economic Development 
M&E     Monitoring and Evaluation 
MC    Mercy Corps 
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MOE     Ministry of Education 
MOH     Ministry of Health 
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MOPWH    Ministry of Public Works and Housing 
MoSD    Ministry of Social Development 
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MSF    Médecins Sans Frontières, or Doctors Without Borders 
Mukhaberat   Arabic term for secret police/intelligence agents/police informants  
MWI     Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
NAR     Needs Assessment Review 
NCD     Non-Communicable Disease 
NDF    The National Defence Forces (Syria) 
NFE     Non-Formal Education 
NGO    Nongovernmental Organization 
NHF    Noor Al Hussein Foundation (Jordan) 
NPS     National Poverty Strategy 
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NRC    The Norwegian Refugee Council 
NRP     National Resilience Plan 
NYLC    National Youth Leadership Council 
NYT    New York Times 
OCHA    United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
OIC    The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
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things go your way because of their position 
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WG    Working Group 
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3RP    Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 
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Figure 15 
This figure includes 2.1 million Syrians registered by UNHCR in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and 
Lebanon, 1.9 million Syrians registered by the Government of Turkey, as well as more than 





This figure includes the total persons of concern in Jordan according to UNHCR. 
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March 16, 2016), http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. 
6 “Total Persons of Concern,” Graph, UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response | Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal 
(Jordan: UNHCR, March 16, 2016), http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is now time to recognize that the international community has a Responsibility to Solve these long-term 
refugee situations and to commit to new strategies for doing so.7 
 
-- T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Stephen Poellot, April 2014 
 
Roots of the Crisis in Syria, the Current Crisis, and the Resulting Syrian Refugee Crisis  
The crisis in Syria is highly complex, multifaceted, and protracted. It is now a situation in 
which multiple wars have been happening at the same time between region and international 
proxies, local power brokers, the Assad regime, and international or transnational terrorist 
organizations. This complexity has only increased over time, and as the crisis became protracted, 
the number of parties to the conflict multiplied several times over. Currently, there are hundreds 
of parties involved in the crisis, ranging from global superpowers (Russia and the United States) 
to tiny and transient local militias but importantly including regional powers (Iran, Hezbollah, 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar) as well as the FSA, Jabhat Al Nusra, Da’esh, the Kurds, and 
the Assad regime. 
One can say it all began with the Syrian Revolution in March 2011, or with the Assad 
regime’s violent crackdown on the uprisings. But the roots of this crisis go far deeper than that. 
First and foremost, it is important to understand the emergence of the modern Syrian state in 
order to understand the current crisis and particularly the rise of Da’esh. Syria was part of the 
Ottoman Empire prior to World War I, as was Iraq, and prior to the Mandate period during the 
interwar years, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, and Jordan were all parts of “Greater Syria.”8 It 
                                                
7 T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Stephen Poellot, “The Responsibility to Solve: The International Community and Protracted 
Refugee Situations,” Virginia Journal of International Law 54, no. 2 (April 2014): 195–222, 
http://ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=98390879&site=eh
ost-live&scope=site. p. 222. 
8 Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History, First Trade Paper Edition (New York: Basic Books, 2011). p. 211. 
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was not until after World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire that the borders we 
see today in the Middle East, or West Asia, emerged. Importantly, the secret Sykes-Picot 
agreement ensured that the French would control what is now Syria and Lebanon while the 
British would control what is now Iraq, Jordan, Israel, and Palestine.9 These borders were 
imposed on the inhabitants of what was the Ottoman Empire from the outside by rival European 
imperial powers competing for territorial control in West Asia (also known as the Middle East) 
and North Africa. This fact has increased Da’esh’s popularity precisely because Da’esh refuses 
to recognize these borders, which after a century have been established and recognized in a 
juridical sense by the international community.  
Next, let us take a moment to look back at Hafez Al-Assad’s10 regime briefly in order to 
understand how this crisis unfolded following the spring 2011 uprisings. Hafez Al-Assad ruled 
over Syria for thirty years through an authoritarian regime of “spectacles” replete with 
“iconography and slogans” used in a cult-like fashion to achieve “domination” through 
“compliance rather than legitimacy.”11 Lisa Wedeen explains that under Hafez Al-Assad’s rule, 
people were “not required to believe the cult’s fictions, and they [did] not, but they [were] 
required to act as if they did.”12 However, under the surface, there was resistance despite this, 
perhaps best exemplified by the growth of opposition in Hama and Hafez Al-Assad’s violent 
suppression of such opposition by perpetrating the 1982 Hama Massacre and crushing any hopes 
of opposition there. Yet cults are fragile and are often highly dependent on a single leader, and 
with the end of the Cold War, increased globalization, and the succession of Bashar Al-Assad, 
this cult was not to last. 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 Hafez Al-Assad was Bashar Al-Assad’s father.  
11 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination | POLITICS, RHETORIC, AND SYMBOLS IN CONTEMPORARY SYRIA (University 
of Chicago Press, 1999), http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo3620666.html. p. 1-6. 
12 Ibid. p. 30. 
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In 2000, there was a short “period of intense political ferment” following Hafez Al-Assad’s 
death after thirty years of rule and the accession of his son Bashar Al-Assad to the presidency 
rather than his older brother Basil Al-Assad, who had died in a car crash in 1994.13 There “was 
much optimism about a young president with exposure to western education who, in his 
inaugural speech, emphasized his determination to modernize Syria.”14 When this short spring 
“turned into the Damascus Winter,” some political asylum seekers began to leave Syria even as 
“aftershocks of mobilization,” such as the “Damascus Declaration Movement of 2005,” 
continued.15 Bashar Al-Assad’s had planned to “modernize authoritarianism” in Syria, but his 
project failed. According to Hinnebusch, he “inherited an authoritarian state with built-in 
vulnerabilities which he set about ‘upgrading’: he went relatively far towards restructuring the 
regime’s social base but failed to undertake a corresponding political adaptation,” and, from 
Hinnebusch’s perspective, the “most dangerous juncture for an authoritarian regime is when it 
seeks to ‘reform’, particularly when the path of reform combines neo-liberalism and crony 
capitalism.”16 Then a “terrible drought” from 2007-2010 “led to agricultural decline” and a 
housing crisis further exacerbated the situation.17 It only took the spark in Tunisia in the spring 
2011 for revolution to come to Syria. 
The Syrian Revolution began with protests in March 2011 in the city of Daraa following the 
uprisings and revolutions of the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Though these 
protests began peacefully, Bashar Al-Assad chose to crackdown on the protests and attempt to 
violently suppress them as his father had done in Hama in 1982, committing crimes against 
                                                
13 James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History, Fourth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). p. 330; Rogan, The 
Arabs: A History. p. 480. 
14 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Syria: From ‘authoritarian Upgrading’ to Revolution?,” International Affairs 88, no. 1 (January 1, 
2012): 95–113, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01059.x. p. 95. 
15 Gelvin, The Modern Middle East. p. 330-331. 
16 Hinnebusch, “Syria." p. 95, 112 
17 Ibid. p. 102. 
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humanity in the process.18 The peaceful uprising quickly turned sour as the combination of 
Assad’s violent crackdown and major regime defections and the formation of the FSA forced 
what started as a peaceful revolution to morph into a civil war. Violence worsened, the regime 
began to commit systematic war crimes and crimes against humanity, and eventually opposition 
groups followed suit, as such crimes became the norm.19 The opposition began to splinter several 
times over, and foreign fighters from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah, and Russia 
intervened to support Assad as foreign fighters and mercenaries also came to join various other 
factions including Jabhat Al Nusra, Da’esh, and the Kurdish groups, among others. Things have 
been further complicated by a regional proxy war in Syria between Iran and Saudi Arabia (and 
the rest of the GCC) as well as an international proxy war between Russia and the United States 
in Syria as Russia formally intervened and the International Coalition comprised of many states 
both from the region and from outside the region intervened with the stated goal of defeating and 
destroying Da’esh in Iraq and Syria.20  
The result of all this has been massive destruction of almost the whole of Syria, the 
splintering of the Syrian state and the Iraqi state into several de facto states at the present 
moment, the growth of Da’esh and an increase in Da’esh and Al Qaeda terrorist attacks 
                                                
18 “‘We’ve Never Seen Such Horror’ Crimes against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces” (Syria: Human Rights Watch, June 1, 
2011), https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/06/01/weve-never-seen-such-horror/crimes-against-humanity-syrian-security-forces. 
19 “Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic | Documentation,” UN, The United Nations 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights OHCHR, accessed March 26, 2016, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/Documentation.aspx; “The Crisis in Syria,” International Coalition 
for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), accessed March 26, 2016, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria; “Amnesty International Report 2014/15 | Syrian Arab 
Republic | Head of State: Bashar Al-Assad | Head of Government: Wael Nader Al-Halqi,” Annual Report (Amnesty 
International, 2015 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/report-syria/; Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), “Over 200,000 People Killed in Syrian Conflict so Far — SOHR,” Syrian Observatory 
For Human Rights, February 8, 2015, http://syriahr.com/en/2015/02/over-200000-people-killed-in-syrian-conflict-so-far-sohr/; 
“SYRIA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 United States Department of 
State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (U.S. Department of State, 2013), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220588.pdf; Ruth Sherlock, “Bashar Al-Assad’s Militias ‘Cleansing’ Homs of 
Sunni Muslims,” July 22, 2013, sec. World, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10195849/Bashar-al-
Assads-militias-cleansing-Homs-of-Sunni-Muslims.html. 
20 Ashley Fantz, “Who Is Doing What in the Coalition Battle against ISIS?,” CNN, September 1, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/14/world/meast/isis-coalition-nations/index.html. 
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worldwide, and the largest refugee and IDP crisis since World War II. Whether or not the recent 
hopes of a truce and potentially a ceasefire and eventual peace agreement actually materialize or 
if Syria once again descends into all-out war, the refugee crisis remains, and realistically most of 
the refugees will not be able to return to Syria in the near future or in the distant future, whether 
or not they wish to do so. 
 
The Failure of the International Community 
The plight of Syrian refugees has become a hot media topic of late. This global crisis has 
become one of the greatest challenges to the human rights regime and one of the greatest crises 
that this generation faces. This concerns not just traditional international refugee law and refugee 
protection but also civil and political rights; sovereignty and identity politics; and economic, 
social, and cultural rights. Yet in the international media the Syrian refugee crisis has mostly 
been discussed in terms of the more recent mass migration to Europe, which is perhaps the 
greatest European migration crisis since the aftermath of World War II, rather than what is 
proportionally and absolutely the even more massive migration from Syria to neighboring host 
countries of Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. But in spite of the great media focus on 
Europe in the past year, these neighboring host countries have been overwhelmed by massive 
influxes of Syrian refugees since the onset of the crisis in Syria following the uprisings that 
began in March 2011. What is more, these generous host countries, whose economies, 
institutions, and political structures are weaker than those of their European and North American 
counterparts, have not received nearly enough support from the international community to cope 
with such large influxes of refugees. Consequently, these neighboring host countries have placed 
more and more restrictions on Syrian refugees. Borders have closed, refugees have been refused 
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asylum, refugees already inside the country are not legally permitted to work and have no civil 
rights inside the country, and the list goes on. The mere fact that it took a mass migration to 
Europe for the world to wake up to the desperate situation in Syria and the resulting Syrian 
refugee crisis sadly demonstrates the extent to which the international community had failed to 
adequately respond to both the crisis inside Syria and the resulting refugee crisis. 
One Jordanian that I interviewed in Amman named Youssef* explained that the Syrian 
refugee crisis “is a wrong on top of a wrong.”21 Youssef* criticized the international community 
and particularly wealthy powerful nations such as the United States and Russia that have 
intervened in Syria, exacerbated the crisis inside Syria rather than resolving it and consequently 
exacerbated the Syrian refugee crisis as well, and then have demanded that the neighboring 
countries to take in the refugees while they sit comfortably at a distance and are not forced to 
take in Syrian refugees.22 He argued that the international community has failed Syria and the 
Syrian refugees primarily by not solving the crisis inside Syria and that this should be prioritized 
over any discussion of what to do with the Syrian refugees residing in Jordan.23 However, 
Youssef* stressed that he does not blame the Syrian refugees themselves and stressed that we 
must treat them like human beings and ensure their rights and dignity while they are here in 
Jordan instead of treating them like victims or weak people that cannot help themselves in a 
paternalistic manner.24  
As international support has diminished and the little savings Syrian refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) have has dwindled, the war in Syria continues to trudge onward into its 
sixth year. The situations in which Syrian refugees and IDPs find themselves have become 
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unsustainable. The world has finally awoken to a protracted refugee crisis that began soon after 
the Syrian uprisings began in March 2011. Yet less than 1% of the world’s refugees are resettled 
in a third country. As a result, many refugees, including not just Syrian refugees but also Iraqi, 
Sudanese, Afghani, Libyan, and other refugees, have been willing to risk their lives to cross the 
Mediterranean and be smuggled across borders into Europe in hopes of reaching wealthy and 
more welcoming EU states because many of them see it as their only chance to survive and lead 
a dignified life.   
While the best situation for both the Syrian refugees and host countries would be if the war in 
Syria ended and the refugees could safely return home, the prospects for such an outcome in the 
near future remain dim, even if the recent discussions of a truce hold. A second ideal solution 
would be true global responsibility sharing. This would include both full financial and logistical 
support for UNHCR and other agencies and organizations providing for the refugees as well as 
increased resettlement on a global scale distributed in a just manner based on economic 
calculations, population, population density, and sociopolitical capacity to integrate the refugees. 
However, achieving true global responsibility sharing for the Syrian refugee crisis (and for that 
matter all refugee crises) is similarly unlikely to happen in the near future, even with increased 
awareness of the crisis and increased empathy toward Syrian refugees. If anything, trends in 
Europe and the U.S. are shifting towards increased xenophobia and fear mongering rather than 
towards increased openness and understanding of our common humanity. One need only listen to 
the Republican presidential candidates in the United States or examine the recent agreement 
between the European Union and Turkey over the migration crisis to see the increasing 
xenophobia and aversion to increased resettlement in most countries in the world today. But 
perhaps even worse, one need only look at wealthy, powerful nations that refuse to take in any 
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Syrian refugees, including Russia, China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates, to see that it is highly unlikely that resettlement can become a sufficient solution for 
the Syrian refugees at least in the near future. With this unfortunate reality in mind, it is essential 
to examine other possible solutions given the climate of protracted conflict in Syria and paralysis 
in the international community. 
 
The Case of Jordan 
Herein I focus exclusively on the case of Jordan. Jordan, like Turkey and Lebanon, has 
generously accepted a very large influx of Syrian refugees. The Kingdom is currently hosting 
approximately 636,040 of the 4,812,993 total persons of concern, which includes both Syrian 
refugees registered with UNHCR and those that are not registered but are nonetheless counted 
among those Syrian individuals in need of humanitarian assistance outside of Syria. 25 
Considering that Jordan’s population is approximately 8,117,564, Syrian refugees now comprise 
roughly 7.8% of the population.26 In contrast, the United States has only taken in approximately 
1,854 Syrian refugees,27 which constitute about 0.000574% of the U.S. population, which was 
estimated at 323,227,742 as of March 25, 2016,28 and plans to accept 10,000 Syrian refugees 
                                                
25 “UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response | Jordan,” Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, Syria Regional Refugee 
Response Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal, (March 16, 2016), http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107; 
“UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response,” Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-
Agency Information Sharing Portal, (March 16, 2016), http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. 
26 “Jordan,” The World Factbook, Publications (Central Intelligence Agency, November 19, 2015), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html; “UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response,” 
UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, December 2, 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. 
27 Haeyoun Park, “Paris Attacks Intensify Debate Over How Many Syrian Refugees to Allow Into the U.S.,” The New York 
Times, November 19, 2015, sec. U.S., http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/21/us/where-syrian-refugees-are-in-the-
united-states.html. 
28 “U.S. and World Population Clock,” U.S. Census Bureau for the United States | U.S. Department of Commerce, March 26, 
2016, http://www.census.gov/popclock/. 
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total,29 which will add up to about 0.00003094% of the total population. Germany has taken in 
about 1,000,000 Syrian refugees, 30  which adds up to about 1.239403% of the German 
population, which stands at about 80,683,980.31 Other wealthy and powerful states such as Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, China, Japan, Russia, and Iran have yet not pledged to take in 
any Syrian refugees. 
Jordan has proven very generous by accepting so many Syrian refugees since the onset of the 
current crisis. Furthermore, its generosity is heightened by the fact that Jordan has previously 
hosted large waves of refugees from Iraq, Syria, and Palestine before the current crisis. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the situation for Syrian refugees in Jordan overall is 
probably better than the situation for Syrian refugees in several other host states. For example, in 
Lebanon, approximately one fourth of the population is now Syrian refugees, and abject poverty, 
sectarian violence, the presence of Hezbollah, and the precarious security situation has made life 
for Syrian refugees more difficult than it is for those living in Jordan.32 As another example, the 
                                                
29 Carol Morello, “Obama Administration to Expand Number of Refugees Admitted to U.S.,” The Washington Post, January 13, 
2016, sec. National Security, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-to-expand-number-
of-refugees-admitted-to-us/2016/01/13/35613e74-ba0b-11e5-99f3-184bc379b12d_story.html. 
30 “Germany on Course to Accept One Million Refugees in 2015,” The Guardian (originally Published by AFP), December 7, 
2015, sec. World news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/08/germany-on-course-to-accept-one-million-refugees-in-
2015. 
31 “Germany Population,” Worldometers, March 26, 2016, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/germany-population/. 
32 Omar Dahi, “The Refugee Crisis in Lebanon and Jordan: The Need for Economic Development Spending,” Forced Migration 
Review, no. 47 (September 2014): 11–13, http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/docview/1561632727?pq-
origsite=summon; Marwan M. Refaat and Kamel Mohanna, “Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: Facts and Solutions,” The Lancet 382, 
no. 9894 (August 31, 2013): 763, doi: http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)61461-0; Ferid Belhaj, 
“Generosity Has Limits: Who’s Helping Lebanon and Jordan Accommodate Syrian Refugees?,” Text, Voices and Views: Middle 
East and North Africa, (May 22, 2015), http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/generosity-has-limits-who-s-helping-lebanon-and-
jordan-accommodate-syrian-refugees; George Sadek, “Legal Status of Refugees: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq,” Web page, 
(June 9, 2015), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugees/legal-status-refugees.php; UNHCR, “Lebanon,” UNHCR, Syria Regional 
Refugee Response Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal | UNHCR, (November 19, 2014), 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122; “Social Cohesion between Syrian Refugees and Urban Host 
Communities in Lebanon and Jordan,” Disaster Management (World Vision, 2015), 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wvi.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FSocial%2520Cohesion%2
520Report.pdf; “Syrian Refugees Living in Jordan and Lebanon: Young, Female, at Risk,” World Bank, December 16, 2015, sec. 
News | Press Release, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/16/syrian-refugees-living-in-jordan-and-
lebanon-caught-in-poverty-trap; “Syria Refugee Response: Lebanon South and El Nabatieh Governorates, Distribution of the 
Registered Syrian Refugees at Cadastral Level - As of 31 October 2014” (Lebanon | Syrian Arab Republic: UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), October 31, 2014), Refworld, http://refworld.org/country,,,,LBN,,54631f084,0.html; 
“Syria Refugee Response Lebanon: North Governorate, Tripoli, Batroun, Bcharreh, El Koura, El Minieh-Dennieh, Zgharta 
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situation in Turkey has proven difficult for Syrian refugees, despite the presence of most of the 
Syrian political organizations and opposition groups there, as a result of the language barrier and 
the unstable security situation as a result of Da’esh, the flow of foreign fighters through southern 
Turkey, the civil violence in Kurdish areas and terrorism committed by Kurdish militant groups, 
and the tension between Turkey and Russia.33 Yet the fact that life is somewhat better for Syrian 
refugees in Jordan than it is in Lebanon and Turkey does not mean that the situation in Jordan is 
perfect and without its own array of issues that require further scrutiny, assessment, and 
adjustment. 
Even though Jordan has absorbed multiple waves of refugees in the past, the situation has 
become anything but hopeful for Syrian refugees. Unable to work and lacking even the most 
basic rights stipulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Optional Protocol, Syrian 
refugees have been forced to live off of their savings and the little humanitarian aid they are able 
to acquire. Rather than increasing rights and privileges for Syrian refugees over time, integrating 
them into the economy, and providing a pathway towards citizenship, Jordan has chosen the 
opposite path by banning them from employment and not guaranteeing them the same rights and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Districts (T+5) - Distribution of the Registered Syrian Refugees at the Cadastral Level as of 31 October 2014” (Lebanon | Syrian 
Arab Republic: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), October 31, 2014), Refworld, 
http://refworld.org/country,,,,LBN,,54631e754,0.html; “Syria Refugee Response: Lebanon-Beirut and Mount Lebanon 
Governorates, Distribution of the Registered Syrian Refugees at the Cadastral Level (as of 31 October 2014)” (Lebanon | Syrian 
Arab Republic: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), October 31, 2014), Refworld, 
http://refworld.org/country,,,,LBN,,54631e2e4,0.html; “Syria Refugee Response Lebanon: Akkar Governorate, Distribution of 
the Registered Syrian Refugees at the Cadastral Level (As of 31 October 2014)” (Syria Refugee Response Lebanon: Akkar 
Governorate: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), October 31, 2014), Refworld, 
http://refworld.org/country,,,,LBN,,54631dd94,0.html; “Suicide Bombers Hit Syria Troops near Lebanon: Monitor, SANA,” 
November 20, 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/87055/World/Region/Suicide-bombers-hit-Syria-troops-near-
Lebanon-Moni.aspx; “Refworld | Lebanon,” accessed November 21, 2014, http://refworld.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&skip=0&query=&coi=LBN. 
33 Pinar Döner, Adem Özkara, and Rabia Kahveci, “Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Numbers and Emotions,” The Lancet 382, no. 
9894 (September 6, 2013): 764, doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(13)61823-1; Suna Gülfer Ihlamur-Öner, “Turkey’s Refugee Regime 
Stretched to the Limit? The Case of Iraqi and Syrian Refugee Flows,” Perceptions 18, no. 3 (Autumn 2013): 191–228, 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/docview/1504460580?pq-origsite=summon; Elizabeth Ferris and Kemal 
Kirişci, “Not Likely to Go Home: Syrian Refugees and the Challenges to Turkey— and the International Community,” Policy 
Paper, Turkey Project Policy Paper Series (1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20036: Center on the United States 
and Europe at Brookings, September 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/09/syrian-refugee-international-
challenges-ferris-kirisci. 
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protections afforded to Jordanian citizens. At first, this was understood among the Syrian 
refugees as a temporary inconvenience, but as time has gone on and the war in Syria continues to 
rage, this way of living is no longer sustainable, even for the more well off refugees. Many have 
chosen to go back to Syria despite the risks because they would rather have their dignity than 
face the temporary permanence of refugeedom, marginalization, and poverty in Jordan. Others 
have chosen to try to reach Europe in hopes of finding a better, more dignified life.  
 
Research Objective 
Herein I will examine the case of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Instead of focusing exclusively 
on the economic impacts of the influx of the Syrian refugees or the humanitarian provisions for 
them, I focus more on legal status and civil and political rights. I will also use noted observations 
and interviews with Jordanian nationals, Syrian refugees, and staff from various UN agencies, 
IGOs and INGOs, and local NGOs obtains during the course of my fieldwork in Jordan. The 
questions I seek to answer in this study are as follows: If the large influx of Syrian refugees are 
unwilling and/or unable to return to Syria and are not resettled elsewhere, and will thus reside in 
Jordan for years to come, will Jordan be obligated to provide a pathway to citizenship and 
meaningful political participation for Syrian refugees? Taking into consideration its legal 
obligations and moral imperatives as well as its domestic and regional security concerns, should 
the Jordanian government provide a pathway to citizenship and meaningful political participation 
for Syrian refugees? How does Jordan perceive its responsibility to the Syrian refugees it is 
currently hosting? Finally, why is full integration a better solution than partial integration, 
protracted responsibility sharing or simply relying on repatriation and resettlement? 
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Research Methodology 
The Syrian refugee crisis, like the war in Syria, is very current, dynamic, protracted, 
multifaceted, and constantly changing. As a result, research on the subject has proven difficult, 
as the situation on the ground is in near constant flux, and consequent conclusions today may 
prove almost irrelevant tomorrow. With this understanding in mind, it is no wonder that the vast 
majority of the sources on the Syrian refugee crisis come from news media, human rights 
reports, UN reports (including UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, UNOHCA, OHCHR, and the UN 
Security Council), INGO reports, local NGO reports, released or leaked intelligence reports, and 
academic work published by universities, journals, and think tanks.  
To answer the questions I posed above, I employ a mixed method with a mainly qualitative 
approach. I employ data from a range of primary and secondary sources as well as emerging 
academic literature. The primary sources consist of observations and interviews gathered during 
the course of my field research in Amman, Jordan and Al Mafraq, Jordan from March 3, 2016 to 
March 22, 2016. For this fieldwork, I interviewed Jordanian nationals (including both East 
Bankers and Palestinians that have Jordanian citizenship), Syrian refugees, and staff from 
various UN agencies, INGOs and IGOs, and local NGOs and took ample notes on my 
observations while working in Amman and in Al Mafraq.  
The secondary sources include a range of reports, qualitative and quantitative data, news 
articles, and academic works as well as key covenants, conventions, treaties, agreements, and 
domestic laws pertinent to international refugee law, international human rights law, 
international humanitarian law, and domestic Jordanian laws pertaining to immigration, asylum, 
labor, and citizenship. 
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Research Significance 
This thesis is significant and relevant not just because the plight of Syrian refugees is making 
headlines these days, but also because the crisis has become protracted, and we can no longer 
look at it strictly from a humanitarian lens. It is useful to examine this issue from a human rights 
lens, as opposed to just a humanitarian lens, a security lens, or a development lens, for several 
reasons. Perhaps most importantly, this lens allows us to see this crisis from the perspective of 
the Syrian refugees themselves and to focus on their rights to live in dignity and have agency 
rather than just survive as “guests” in host countries fully dependent on insufficient and 
dwindling humanitarian assistance. This is also a security issue, as those lacking legitimate fora 
to influence politics and change their realities often mobilize politically outside the realms of the 
state structure and may turn to violent means of political participation to achieve their goals. 
Thus, the fulfillment of Syrian refugees’ human rights, including civil and political rights, is not 
just a moral imperative, but it is also in Jordan’s long-term national security interest and in the 
international community’s security interest. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE STATUS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN JORDAN 
 
To deny any person their human rights is to challenge their very humanity. To impose on them a wretched 
life of hunger and deprivation is to dehumanize them.34 
 
--Nelson Mandela, June 1990 
 
Poverty is the absence of all human rights. The frustrations, hostility and anger generated by abject 
poverty cannot sustain peace in any society. For building stable peace we must find ways to provide 
opportunities for people to live decent lives.35 
 
-- Muhammad Yunus, 2006 Nobel Peace Prize Awardee, December 10, 2006 
 
The situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan is dire. Syrian refugees initially were welcomed 
generously as brothers, but now that the refugee crisis has become protracted, much has changed, 
and some of that welcome has worn off.36 Most of the Syrian refugees no longer can live off of 
their savings and face poverty and uncertainty.37 Humanitarian aid has been woefully insufficient 
since the onset of the crisis, and humanitarian organizations have had to operate on 
approximately 50% of their budgets throughout much of the crisis.38 In addition, Syrian refugees 
                                                
34 “The Mandel Visit; Excerpts From Mandela Speech to Joint Meeting of Congress,” The New York Times, June 27, 1990, sec. 
World, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/27/world/the-mandel-visit-excerpts-from-mandela-speech-to-joint-meeting-of-
congress.html. 
35 Muhammad Yunus, “Nobel Lecture” (Nobel Peace Prize 2006 Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank, Oslo, December 10, 2006), 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/yunus-lecture-en.html. 
36 Alexandra Francis, “Jordan’s Refugee Crisis,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Middle East Program, 




38 Ibid.; “UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response,” March 16, 2016; Patrick Kingsley, “Syrian Refugees in Jordan: ‘If They 
Cut the Coupons, We Will Probably Die,’” The Guardian, February 3, 2016, sec. World - Middle East, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/03/syrian-refugees-jordan-london-conference; Marc Perelman, “The Interview - 
Jordan ‘Needs More Assistance’ from International Community for Syrian Refugees,” Interview, THE INTERVIEW (DEAD 
SEA: France 24, May 28, 2015), http://www.france24.com/en/20150527-interview-imad-najib-fakhoury-jordan-minister-
cooperation-syrian-refugees-assistance; “OVERVIEW: 2015-SYRIA RESPONSE PLAN AND 2015-2016 REGIONAL 
REFUGEE AND RESILIENCE PLAN” (Berlin, December 18, 2014), http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
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are not permitted to work in Jordan and are marginalized economically, socially, and 
politically.39 The status quo has undoubtedly become unsustainable.  
 
Jordan’s Generosity 
Jordan has demonstrated “extraordinary generosity in hosting refugees” even as its 
“communities are under considerable strain as basic services are overstretched.”40 The Kingdom 
is hosting an incredibly high number of Syrian refugees—approximately 636,040 of the 
4,812,993 UNHCR’s total persons of concern, which includes both Syrian refugees registered 
with UNHCR and those that are not registered but are nonetheless counted among those Syrian 
individuals in need of humanitarian assistance outside of Syria.41  
One Jordanian small business owner I interviewed in Al Mafraq named Abdullah* told me 
that the Syrians in Jordan are “our guests and our brothers” and are welcome here in Jordan.42 He 
said that “we welcome them and must help them” especially since their situation is generally 
worse than that of Jordanians, even with the unemployment among Jordanians and the fact that 
                                                
39 “Access to Work for Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Discussion Paper on Labour and Refugee Laws and Policies,” Discussion 
Paper (Beirut, Lebanon: International Labour Organization Regional Office for Arab States, September 2015), 
http://www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_357950/lang--en/index.htm; Kate Washington et al., “Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework (VAF) | Baseline Survey,” Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) Baseline Survey, Jordan Refugee Response 
(UNHCR Jordan, May 2015), http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107; “Overview of Right to Work for 
Refugees Syria Crisis Response: Lebanon & Jordan,” From Harm To Home (International Rescue Committee), accessed March 
13, 2016, https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rescue.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fresource-
file%2FIRC%2520Policy%2520Brief%2520Right%2520to%2520Work%2520for%2520Refugees%2520.pdf; Maha Kattaa, 
“Social Protection and Employment for Syrian Refugees in Jordan,” accessed October 26, 2015, 
http://www.rdw2015.org/uploads/submission/full_paper/20/Social_protection_and_employment__the_case_of_Syrian_refugees_
in_Jordan.pdf; Svein Erik Stave and Solveig Hillesund, Implications of the influx of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labour 




40 “3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan in Response to the Syrian Crisis 2016-2017,” 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience 
Plan (UNHCR and UNDP, 2016), http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/. 
41 “UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response | Jordan,” Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, Syria Regional Refugee 
Response Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal, (March 16, 2016), http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107; 
“UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response,” Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-
Agency Information Sharing Portal, (March 16, 2016), http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. 
42 Jordanian 4, interview by Rachel Mayer, Voice Recorder (MP3), March 18, 2016, 4. 
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the influx of Syrian refugees has exacerbated Jordan’s economic problems, because they are not 
allowed to work, are often denied the aid they are promised, and are completely dependent on 
humanitarian organizations and charities that oftentimes are corrupt and nepotistic in their 
dealings with them.43 Abdullah* employs a Syrian refugee in his store named Firas* (who I also 
interviewed) who has been denied aid several times. However, Abdullah* concluded that the 
situation cannot really improve until the crisis in Syria is resolved so that the Syrian refugees can 
finally return home in peace.44 
The international community must not forget that Jordan, in addition to Lebanon and Turkey, 
is “providing a global public good to the international community by hosting an incredibly high 
number of Syrian refugees” at great domestic cost and with insufficient support from the 
international community.45  According to Khetam Malkawi’s article in The Jordan Times, 
“Economists and UN officials feel that the international community is taking Jordan's generosity 
for granted and not supporting the Kingdom enough in sharing the unprecedented burden of 
hosting thousands of Syrian refugees.”46 According to a statement by the UNHCR representative 
to Jordan Andrew Harper in quoted in this article, “one of the reasons that have driven refugees 
to go to Europe is the insufficient support provided by the international community to Jordan and 
the World Food Programme (WFP) in particular to mitigate the impact of the crisis.”47 Jordan’s 
generosity must be appreciated and the international community must take on its share of 
                                                
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Belhaj, “Generosity Has Limits.” 
46 Khetam Malkawi, “World Should Not Take Jordan’s Generosity for Granted — Officials, Relief Workers,” Jordan Times, 
November 15, 2015, sec. Local, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/world-should-not-take-jordan%E2%80%99s-
generosity-granted-%E2%80%94-officials-relief-workers. 
47 Ibid. 
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responsibility in helping Jordan to cope with the crisis. The international community “must step 
up its efforts.”48  
However, lack of sufficient funding for humanitarian and development assistance and 
economic weaknesses do not negate the responsibility of every state to ensure human rights 
protections for those residing within its borders. Furthermore, Jordan’s generosity for taking in 
more refugees does not override its responsibility to uphold international human rights law and 
international refugee law and to ensure that Syrian refugees have the same legal protections to 
ensure that their human rights and domestic civil rights are upheld as those afforded to Jordanian 
nationals.  
 
The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Jordan  
Let us more closely examine the legal status of refugees in Jordan. Although Jordan has not 
signed and ratified the Refugee Convention, it does have a long history of hosting refugees, 
including most notably Palestinian refugees as well as more recently Iraqi refugees.49 Although 
Jordan is not party to the Refugee Convention, “article 21 of the Jordanian Constitution prohibits 
extradition of ‘political refugees.’”50  In addition, “Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and 
Foreigners’ Affairs requires that those entering the country as political asylum seekers present 
themselves to a police station within forty-eight hours of their arrival.”51 Nevertheless, “Article 
31 of this Law grants the Minister of the Interior the authority to determine on a case-by-case 
                                                
48 “3RP 2016-2017.” 
49 Geraldine Chatelard, “Jordan: A Refugee Haven,” Migrationpolicy.org, August 31, 2010, 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/jordan-refugee-haven; Saleh Al-Kilani, “A Duty and a Burden on Jordan,” Forced 
Migration Review, no. 47 (September 2014): 30–31, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1561632668?pq-origsite=summon&; 
Mona Christophersen, “Jordan: Seeking Progress in the Land of Refugees,” IPI Global Observatory, February 3, 2015, 
http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/02/jordan-progress-land-refugees/. 
50 George Sadek, “Legal Status of Refugees: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq,” Web page, (December 2013), 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugees/legal-status-refugees.php. 
51 Ibid. 
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basis whether persons that entered illegally will be deported” even though “it does not identify 
conditions under which individuals will be eligible for asylum” and it “also does not impose any 
sanctions against asylum seekers who entered the country illegally.”52  Furthermore, “Refugees 
do not automatically acquire rights to residency, employment, public education, or health care,” 
and all foreigners, including refugees, are not able to “live in the country without acquiring a 
residency permit,” and “such permits in most cases are valid for one year only.”53 In practice, 
residency status has “generally been granted only to Palestinians except under special 
circumstances,” and “this exception has not been implemented for Syrian refugees” to date.54 
The legal situation is even more stringent than this with respect to employment. “The 1954 
Constitution spells out most clearly that the right to work in Jordan is reserved exclusively for 
Jordanian citizens.”55 According to the 1973 Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs Law, Jordanian 
nationals and companies are “not to employ foreigners without a valid residence permit.”56 But  
“this law allows for exemptions in connection with humanitarian needs or political asylum.”57 
The Ministry of Labor “publishes a list of professions and industries in which only Jordanian 
citizens are allowed to work,” including “medical, engineering, administrative, accounting and 
clerical professions; telephone and warehouse employment; sales; education; hairdressing; 
decorating; fuel sales; electrical and mechanical occupations; guards; drivers; and construction 
workers.”58 “Labour Law No. 8 of 1996 defines the rights, protections and responsibilities for all 
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 “Access to Work for Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Discussion Paper on Labour and Refugee Laws and Policies,” Discussion 
Paper (Beirut, Lebanon: International Labour Organization Regional Office for Arab States, September 2015), 
http://www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_357950/lang--en/index.htm. p. 13. 
55 “Access to Work for Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Discussion Paper on Labour and Refugee Laws and Policies,” Discussion 
Paper (Beirut, Lebanon: International Labour Organization Regional Office for Arab States, September 2015), 
http://www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_357950/lang--en/index.htm. p. 13. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Sadek, “Legal Status of Refugees,” December 2013. 
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workers and employers, except for those in the domestic and agricultural sectors (who are 
covered under separate laws).” 59  However, this law “does not contain any references to 
‘refugees’ or ‘asylum seekers’.”60 Finally, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between 
UNHCR and the Jordanian government signed in 1998 stipulated that, “asylum seekers can 
remain in Jordan for six months after recognition, during which time the UNHCR has to find a 
resettlement country for them.”61 
However, this grim legal picture does not fully paint the picture of refugee status in Jordan. 
As it turns out, the laws toward refugees are discriminatory and depend on the country from 
which the refugee fled (and in the case of Palestinians, where in Palestine they are from and 
when they fled) as well as when he or she fled. For example, “article 2 of the country’s 
nationality law, Law No. 6 of 1954” is case in point here—it “grants Jordanian nationality to all 
Palestinians that lived in Jordan between December 20, 1949, and February 16, 1954” but has 
not been applied to Palestinian refugees from Gaza nor to Iraqi or Syrian refugees.62 This is 
because Jordan controlled the West Bank from 1948 to 1967, and it did not relinquish its 
territorial claims to the West Bank until 1988 following the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987.  
“To the extent that the United States can be considered a nation of immigrants, Jordan is a 
nation of refugees.”63 Yet instead of being gradually integrated into Jordanian society, most 
refugees “are still considered refugees even decades after entering the country and are often 
                                                
59 “Access to Work for Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Discussion Paper on Labour and Refugee Laws and Policies." p. 13 
60 Ibid. 
61 Sadek, “Legal Status of Refugees,” December 2013. 
62 Ibid.; Kingdom of Jordan, Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality (last Amended 1987), JOR-110, 1954, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ea13.html; ةموظنم تاعیرشتلا ةینیطسلفلا, نوناق ةیسنجلا ةیندرلأا نوناق مقر (6) ةنسل 1954, 1954, 
http://www.dft.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_dataentry&pid=12&leg_id=%20371; Oroub El Abed, “Immobile Palestinians: 
Ongoing Plight of Gazans in Jordan,” Forced Migration Review, no. 26 (August 1, 2006): 17–18, 
http://ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=22486500&site=eh
ost-live&scope=site; Michael Vicente Pérez, “Human Rights and the Rightless: The Case of Gaza Refugees in Jordan,” The 
International Journal of Human Rights 15, no. 7 (October 1, 2011): 1031–54, doi:10.1080/13642987.2010.482911. 
63 Christophersen, “Jordan.” 
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denied rights enjoyed by the rest of the population.”64 For a nation of refugees, “Jordan’s overall 
record on refugees is nonetheless a very mixed one.”65 It has not signed the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, but it has “generally offered generous humanitarian hospitality and temporary 
protection to its refugees.” 66  Nevertheless, “while Palestinian refugees residing in Jordan 
between December 20, 1949, and February 16, 1954, were granted Jordanian citizenship, those 
arriving since then have suffered from temporary and limited rights.”67  
 
The Socioeconomic Realities for Both Syrian Refugees and Jordanian Nationals 
The socioeconomic realities for both Syrian refugees living in Jordan and many Jordanian 
nationals are difficult and have worsened in recent years. For most Syrian refugees in Jordan, the 
socioeconomic situation is very hard. As the crisis in Syria enters its sixth year now, the Syrian 
refugees in Jordan can no longer rely on their savings, which have since dried up. Furthermore, 
since humanitarian aid has consistently been underfunded and Syrian refugees are not legally 
permitted to work in Jordan, their socioeconomic situation has become impossibly grim and 
unsustainable. Many have turned to desperate measures and “negative coping strategies” such as 
“reduction in food consumption, withdrawing children from school and taking on informal, 
exploitative or dangerous employment.”68 For many Syrian refugees living in Jordan, the 
socioeconomic challenges have become so great that they have chosen to risk even more 
dangerous choices such as returning to Syria despite the very real dangers or attempting to make 
it to Europe through smuggling routes or crossing the Mediterranean Sea.  
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It must be acknowledged that many Jordanians have also been impacted by the crisis, as the 
large influx of Syrian refugees in Jordan over such a short period of time has significantly 
impacted the economy, the state infrastructure, and the sociopolitical situation as Jordan 
struggles to hold on to its distinct national identity. Although it is impossible to determine the 
full economic impact, both negative and positive, the “Jordanian Economic and Social Council 
has stated that the cost to Jordan per Syrian refugee is over US$3,500 per year and the direct cost 
is currently at US$1.2 billion and is expected to rise to $4.2 billion by 2016.”69 In addition, as 
Jordan is “facing a severe water crisis and needing to recruit more armed forces, but lacking 
adequate funds, the country has formulated a National Resilience Plan in an effort to protect 
Jordanian infrastructure.”70 
But in spite of the negative rhetoric and widespread assumptions that the Syrian refugees are 
a burden on the Jordanian economy, there actually have been a number of very positive impacts 
as a direct result of their presence in Jordan. One major positive impact has been economic 
growth and expansion as a result of both rapid population increase and increased development 
assistance. When the population in a country increases, consumption increases, demand 
increases, there is resulting job growth and labor markets expand, and prices increase, benefitting 
business owners, manufacturers, and other producers. A Jordanian I interviewed named 
Youssef*, who is a student at the University of Jordan and works at a café part-time explained 
that this is already happening in Jordan, and the economy and labor markets have already 
expanded and continuing to grow because of the Syrian refugee influx and the increased 
development funds coming into Jordan.71 This has already started to occur in Jordan and is easily 
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observable in the rapid development happening in Amman as well a the growth in the city of Al 
Mafraq, which only had a few stores before 2011 and now has many new businesses as the 
economy has multiplied in size. In addition to this, consumers in Jordan have benefitted from the 
presence of Syrian refugees because Syrians are willing to take jobs that Jordanians do not want 
and work longer hours for lower wages and less benefits, thus reducing the prices and improving 
the services available to Jordanians in markets such as construction and food service. A 
Jordanian woman I interviewed named Randa*, who is a corporate lawyer from West Amman, 
explained that before the Syrians came, restaurants and cafes used to be full of Egyptian migrant 
workers, but now Syrians have taken many of those jobs instead of the Egyptian foreign workers. 
She said that in her opinion, the Syrians have generally been better workers anyway, working 
longer hours, providing better service and better quality food, and charging less than the 
Egyptians did before them, which benefits Jordanian consumers. Furthermore, increased 
development assistance has benefitted not only Syrians but also Jordanians, since, according to 
the individuals I talked to from UNICEF, ARDD-Legal Aid, and Blue Umbrella Organization, 
development projects are generally required to benefit both Syrians and Jordanians in order to 
receive government approval, funding, and support, and most projects allocate 30-50% of their 
budget exclusively to benefit Jordanians in host communities.  
However, there have also been some negative effects on Jordan’s economy and on Jordanian 
nationals as a result of the Syrian refugee influx. Economic development is often uneven, and 
Jordanians do face several challenges as a result. Another Jordanian I interviewed in the city of 
Al Mafraq named Mahmud* explained that prices have increased, especially housing prices, and 
wages have decreased, labor standards have worsened, and many employers employ Syrians 
illegally instead of Jordanians because they can pay them a lot less and do not have to give them 
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benefits or labor protections. From his perspective, Syrians have received aid and assistance 
from many humanitarian organizations and charities, but Jordanians have not received anything, 
even though they are also struggling and the Syrian refugee influx has made their situation 
worse. Mahmud* argued that the situation in Al Mafraq is improving though because “Syrians 
are leaving” and are either returning to Syria, going to Europe, or going elsewhere. Mahmud* 
did not acknowledge the economic growth and development that has occurred in Al Mafraq since 
2011 and argued that the situation will get better when the Syrians lave and either go back to 
Syria or go elsewhere. Although this perspective is rather narrow-minded and based more on his 
own experience and emotional reaction rather than on the data and the facts, this perspective is 
representative of a large number of Jordanians, especially “East Banker” Jordanians in poverty 
pockets such as much of the city of Al Mafraq, who have felt overwhelmed by the Syrian refugee 
influx, especially since there are currently more Syrians than Jordanians in Al Mafraq. 
Nevertheless, there is some truth to some of his statements. For example, wages have decreased 
because Syrians are working illegally for much lower wages. Also, housing prices have 
increased because of the increase in demand due to the Syrian refugee influx.  
Nevertheless, many of the economic woes in Jordan, especially in poverty pockets, are not a 
direct result of the Syrian refugee influx. It is important to acknowledge that Jordan’s economy 
was not very strong at the onset of the refugee crisis. “Jordan has a world of problems, all visible 
in its expanding capital, Amman: too many unemployed young people, rising food and energy 
prices, political upheaval across the region and a war in Syria that has landed the country with 
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more than 600,000 refugees.”72 The Syrian refugee influx may not be the key causal factor for 
most of the economic problems that Jordan currently faces. 
In many ways, the large influx of refugees has exacerbated some of Jordan’s economic woes 
and other problems. Given their dire circumstances, many Syrians are willing to work for “half 
the subsistence wage a Jordanian would expect” and “live two or three families to a flat built for 
one.”73 This naturally has the potential to drive down wages, cause a housing crisis, overwhelm 
the sewage and transit systems, and drain the already scarce water resources.74 The international 
community has provided some financial and other assistance, but Jordan needs more support to 
cope with the crisis. 
Svein Erik Stave and Solveig Hillesund of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and 
Fafo produced an important 153 page report on the subject of the economic impact of Syrian 
refugees in Jordan this year entitled “Implications of the influx of Syrian refugees on the 
Jordanian labour market: findings from the governorates of Amman, Irbid and Mafraq.”75 This 
large influx of Syrian refugees has had a significant impact on the Jordanian labor market. Some 
important demographic findings from this study are that most of the Syrian refugees in Jordan 
are from rural areas of Syria, and overall, their education levels are much lower than that of 
Jordanians.76 The labor market among Syrian refugees is also highly gendered, with only 7% of 
Syrian women participating in the Jordanian economy and 88% of those women outside of the 
camps unemployed.77 The first key finding was that about 30% of those that were working in the 
industrial or agricultural sectors prior to 2011 are no longer working in those industries and the 
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number of Jordanian males working in construction has decreased as the number of Syrian 
refugees working in construction as increased significantly as has the number of Syrian refugees 
working in retail and sales, thus indicating that Syrian refugees are crowding the Jordanian labor 
market.78 The second key finding was that, as Syrian refugees are not legally allowed to work, 
only 10% acquired official work permits, and the rest of those working are working in the black 
market outside of the scope of Jordanian labor law and the protections it provides to those 
working in the country legally.79 Nevertheless, Syrian refugees are willing to accept jobs and 
wages that Jordanians are not willing to accept.80  
The ILO/Fafo report presents four effects of this refugee influx on Jordan’s labor market: (1) 
the loss of an opportunity to grow Jordanian employment in emerging low-skilled jobs, (2) 
increased competition for existing jobs, (3) future threats of overcrowding in the labor market, 
and (4) the general deterioration in working conditions is leading to more 
shortcomings/deficiencies in decent work in Jordan.81 Based on these results, the report presents 
the following prescriptions: (1) tackle and formalize the informal economy and reduce informal 
employment, (2) encourage the private sector to employ Syrian refugees in the sectors that 
permit the recruitment of migrant workers, (3) develop realistic scenarios for the development of 
the Jordanian labor market as a basis for any strategy in the labor market, (4) maximize the 
possibilities for short-term employment in the economy of aid and coordinating arrangements 
between the international community and the Jordanian government, (5) improve the link with 
the National Employment Strategy, and (6) promote school enrollment among Syrian children.82 
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Alexandra Francis argues that the “Syrian refugee crisis has exacerbated endemic political, 
economic, and resource challenges in Jordan.”83 As the war in Syria has continued and has 
entered a protracted state, “Jordan has limited its humanitarian response” rather than increasing 
it.84 Francis lists four main challenges to addressing the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan:  
1. The massive size of the Syrian refugee influx (620,000 Syrians registered with UNHCR) 
and the fact that 84% of Syrian refugees do not live in refugee camps.85 
2. The increased stress on “economic and resource infrastructure in Jordan, which was 
already suffering from structural issues before the refugee crisis.”86 
3. “The Jordanian public consistently overstates the negative impacts of the Syrian refugee 
influx, while the positive impacts receive far less attention, highlighting the politicized 
nature of the refugee crisis in Jordan. Public sentiment toward Syrian refugees has a 
deleterious effect on the government’s ability to respond productively to the refugee 
influx.”87 
4. “Confronted with persistently underfunded humanitarian appeals, Jordan has lost 
confidence in international donor support. Without additional aid and a sustainable 
response to the refugee crisis, Jordan will continue to restrict the protection space for 
Syrians. Doing so will increase the long-term risks of instability in Jordan and the 
region.”88 
Yet in spite of the apparent “burdens” that the Syrian refugee population has placed on 
Jordan, these same Syrian refugees can and are already contributing to the economy and to 
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Jordan’s development. In a report released by Chatham House, Doris Carrion explains that the 
Syrian refugee crisis has caused an 8% increase in the Jordanian population, a presence which 
“has raised fears over competition for resources and opportunities.”89 Nevertheless, Jordanian 
communities “have partly benefited from the presence of refugees and the international aid that 
has come with them,” even though the most negative impacts of the Syrian refugee crisis have 
“hit the most vulnerable people in their country hardest.”90  
Jordan also views the refugees as a social and political burden that threatens its national 
identity.  It is important to note that many Jordanians consider this issue to be the major problem. 
“More than 40% of Jordan's current population originates from other countries, including two 
million Palestinians, up to 1.3 million Syrians and 29,000 Iraqis.”91 For economic, supposedly 
demographic, and resulting security reasons, “to protect its national identity in these 
circumstances,” and given “the complicated situation in the region generally,” Jordan “has not 
become a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention.”92 Instead, “Jordan's law on refugees is defined 
by a 1998 Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR, amended in April 2014,” which 
“includes the Convention's definition of 'refugee' and accepts the principle of non-refoulement 
and third country resettlement for refugees” but “does not allow for local integration as a 
solution.”93 
These trends are easy to observe in how humanitarian agencies and organizations, NGOs, 
development organizations, and charities in Jordan strategize and design programs and projects. 
During his fieldwork in the summer of 2014 in Jordan, Davidson found an array of “short-term 
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aid projects designed by the NGOs to meet the various needs of the refugees” but “no plans to 
approach the issue Syrians’ need with any long-term solutions.”94 Consequently, “the Syrian 
refugees in Jordan, like refugees elsewhere are stuck in cycles of temporary permanence.”95 
Similarly, during the course of my own fieldwork in March 2016 I found that most UN agencies, 
INGOs, and local NGOs still approached the Syrian refugee issue in a short-term manner with 
the understanding that the Syrian refugees were not going to be in Jordan forever and that they 
were not going to be integrated locally in Jordan. These organizations included the ICRC, 
UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, and Amal ou Salam, among others. Notable exceptions that actually 
had long-term strategies, programs, and projects included JOHUD, ARDD-Legal Aid, and Blue 
Umbrella Organization.  
 
Human Rights Violations, Loss of Dignity, and an Unsustainable Status Quo 
No one can say that the human rights situation in Jordan is anywhere near as bad as is the 
situation inside Syria, and on a scale, the human rights situation in Jordan is very good compared 
to that of Syria. Nevertheless, Syrian refugees in Jordan are facing human rights violations and 
suffer from an unsustainable status quo and a growing loss of dignity and hope. Some of these 
are clear legal violations, such as deportations in violation of the principles of non-refoulement 
enumerated in both international refugee law and domestic Jordanian law. Many of the Syrian 
refugees I interviewed in both Amman and Al Mafraq were terrified of deportation and felt that 
there was a high likelihood that they could be deported if caught working, committing a 
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misdemeanor, or being at the wrong place and the wrong time.96 Other less tangible violations 
that many of the Syrian refugees I interviewed in Amman and Al Mafraq brought up were social 
and economic rights violations such as denial of the right to work and denial of access to 
adequate healthcare and education.97 Other human rights violations that I observed and that 
several Syrian refugees I interviewed told me about included restrictions on the freedom of 
movement and intense monitoring by the mukhaberat. 
Consider the story of one Syrian refugee family I met in Al Mafraq. I first met Adnan* very 
briefly on the street and briefly interviewed him before he introduced me to his sister Reem*.  
They were originally from Homs, but after their city was bombed again and again, so much so 
that the city became unrecognizable amid the widespread destruction, they were forced to flee, 
first internally as IDPs for awhile, and eventually as refugees, crossing the border, entering 
Za’atari refugee camp and registering with UNHCR. When Adnan* and Reem* first fled to 
Jordan, Adnan* was able to work because he had had a work permit in Jordan before the crisis in 
Syria began. It was for this reason that Reem* came to join him in Jordan in the first place, 
joining him in Amman after a short period in Za’atari. However, as time went by, Adnan’s* 
permit and Syrian documents expired, and he could no longer work legally in Jordan. For this 
reason, Reem* made the incredibly difficult decision that her three boys had to remain together 
in Lebanon without her. They lost her husband in Syria and since his disappearance have come 
to the conclusion that he was killed. Reem* has only her brother Adnan* and her grandmother 
with her in Jordan. Caught working illegally, Adnan* was forcibly send to Azraq after being 
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detained without food for two days and being dumped at the camp in the middle of the night. He 
was forced to pay 5,000 JD as bail. Azraq camp was horrible. Reem* described the camp to me 
as a prison that is very difficult to get in and out of and that receives much less international 
attention and far less goods and services than Za’atari camp. Reem* and Adnan* came to Al 
Mafraq after escaping Azraq “illegally” because Amman was far too expensive and more 
importantly because the only chance they had for Adnan* to regain his right to work in Jordan 
was by retrieving his documents from Syria. When I spoke to both of them in mid-March 2016, 
Adnan* had not yet attempted to cross the border yet. Reem* explained that they had no 
refrigerator and no washing machine because they could not afford it. She said that she and her 
brother had begun to sell everything, including all of their modest furniture except two beds and 
a few other things in order to survive.  
Reem* explained to me that the reason for their terrible socioeconomic was threefold—one, 
the terrible protracted crisis in Syria; two, their legal status in Jordan, which afforded them “no 
rights” and no dignity in Jordan; and three, the insufficiency and corruption in the humanitarian 
sector, which had denied her aid and did not help her whatsoever. Reem* explained that she and 
her brother were denied aid from UNHCR and from other humanitarian organizations because 
they are not categorized as “most vulnerable.” This is because her brother is a single male, and, 
on paper, UNHCR considers her a single woman because her children are in Lebanon alone 
without her, and her husband disappeared in Syria and is likely dead. To make matters worse, 
Jordan does not permit Syrian refugees to return if they leave Jordan. This means that Reem* has 
not seen her children in about four years, and she has no way of doing so because Lebanon will 
not accept her, Syrian refugees have been detained at the airport in Turkey, or at least that is 
what she was told, and there is no way for her children to come to Jordan.  
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Reem* also complained of widespread corruption in the humanitarian sector and among 
translators and fixers working with Syrian refugees in Jordan. She said that aid was often 
unjustly distributed, with some that were doing ok receiving humanitarian assistance while 
others who desperately needed it being denied such assistance. She said that what was even 
worse was that sometimes non-Arabic speakers would come to talk to Syrians with translators 
that were completely unprofessional. She explained that the Iraqi translators were honest and 
professional, but many of the Jordanian translators intentionally omitted things that were said, 
added their own personal commentary, or simply made the situation sound a lot better than it was 
to maintain Jordan’s good image internationally. Reem told me that Jordanians did not mind that 
the international community saw how difficult the socioeconomic situation was for Syrian 
refugees in Jordan, but they did not want them to see it as a result of the legal status given to 
Syrian refugees in Jordan.  
In addition, Reem* told me that the mukhaberat in Al Mafraq seemed to be overly concerned 
with any interactions Syrians had with Christians, regardless of the reasons for such interactions. 
She said she understands proselytizing is illegal in Jordan, but back in her neighborhood in 
Homs, she, a Sunni Muslim, lived in the same neighborhood as Christians, Murshidis, Druze, 
and others. Before the crisis began, they had lived in peace. She said that what they had was 
beyond coexistence—they had shared each other’s lives, holidays, and celebrations. It is for that 
reason especially that she could not understand why the Jordanians seemed to be so concerned 
with people of different religions talking to one another. She said that her beliefs were personal 
and they had no right to restrict her from talking to Christians or others solely based on religion 
or the fear that she might convert. She told me that after talking to individuals from Christian 
humanitarian organizations before, the mukhaberat came to her house and told her not to speak 
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to them again. This even happened with a friend of hers. She said that people had resorted to 
wearing hijab to come see her to avoid suspicion and the unwelcome involvement of the 
mukhaberat. To her, it seemed that some Jordanians were more concerned about Christians 
proselytizing than about Syrians surviving.  
Reem* and Adnan*’s socioeconomic situation in Jordan in addition to their trauma and 
family separation have become so difficult that they have given up hope. Reem* told me that 
there are no solutions, no matter how hard I try. She said that a solution may help some people, 
but it cannot solve everything—there is no silver bullet. Defeated and hopeless, she exclaimed 
that she has only two choices: return to Syria in peace, or return to Syria and die.  
Consider another story from a different family I met in Al Mafraq. Though not as terrible as 
Reem* and Adnan*’s socioeconomic situation, the situations of most other Syrian refugees I 
interviewed are far from easy. Another Homsi98 family I interviewed while in Al Mafraq 
similarly faced a difficult and unsustainable socioeconomic situation. At minimum, this family is 
all together in Jordan, with no one left in Syria or separated and living elsewhere as a refugee far 
from their family. I met Kamal*, his wife Nour*, several of their small children, all of whom 
were under age five or six, and Kamal’s* brother Nizar*. Their situation was a little better, since 
they received some humanitarian aid from UNICEF for the children and a small amount from 
UNHCR and CARE since they are categorized as a family rather than a single individual. 
Nevertheless, life is not easy, as they are not able to work. Kamal* was a construction worker 
back in Syria and was able to provide for his family, but now he can hardly make ends meet. 
Nizar* is in a similar situation, and he too has children to support. To make matters worse, 
Kamal* explained to me that prices—especially housing prices—have been continuously 
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increasing. Kamal* said he feels that there is a preference for migrant foreign workers from Asia 
over Syrians, and he does not understand why. He explained that there is discrimination and 
prejudice against Syrians and that Jordanians (at least in Al Mafraq) do not care about the 
Syrians’ plight even though most Syrians [in Al Mafraq] suffer greatly. He said that the situation 
was further exacerbated by the fact that they had to deal with corruption and nepotism in 
UNHCR and most aid agencies and zulum in aid distribution, access (or lack thereof) to services 
like medical care, and access to resources. Kamal* and Nizar* differed in how they felt about the 
overall situation and their future, however. Although Nour* seemed hesitant, Kamal* explained 
that he had tried for resettlement and had talked to UNHCR and a Canadian official, but he had 
not heard back in months and did not know his status or how likely it was that his family might 
actually be able to resettle elsewhere. Kamal* and Nizar* both explained to me that everyone is 
homesick, but there is no home to go back to. He said that Homs is completely destroyed, Syria 
is broken, and there is nothing for them there. Nizar* told me that many Syrian s are turning to 
drugs and alcohol if they can get their hands on them to escape and forget about how miserable 
their situation has become. Kamal* said that life had become unbearable and impossible in 
Jordan, and unless there are major changes, then there is nothing for him in Jordan either.  
The status quo in Jordan has become unsustainable, unjust, and unacceptable for both Syrian 
refugees and Jordanian nationals. The next chapter further examines the dangers of maintaining 
the status quo and the necessity of finding solutions and changing policies in order to mitigate 
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CHAPTER 2: RISKS OF MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO 
What happens to a dream deferred? 
 
Does it dry up 
Like a raisin in the sun? 
Or fester like a sore— 
And then run? 
Does it stink like rotten meat? 
Or crust and sugar over— 
Like a syrupy sweet? 
 
Maybe it just sags 
Like a heavy load. 
 
Or does it explode? 
 
-- Langston Hughes, “Harlem” from Collected Poems99 
 
The policies of non-integration for Syrian refugees in Jordan have become unsustainable for 
both Syrian refugees and Jordanians. If no major changes are made, there could be serious 
consequences. The risks of not changing these policies to cope with the present realities 
regarding the Syrian refugees in Jordan could involve not just negative impacts for the Syrian 
refugees residing in Jordan, but also negative impacts on Jordan’s economy and infrastructure as 
well as domestic, regional, and global security. In this chapter, the potential impacts of both the 
large Syrian refugee influx and the Jordanian policies of non-integration and protracted 
humanitarian assistance are further examined in terms of (1) the Syrian refugees themselves, (2) 
Jordan’s economy and infrastructure, and (3) the possible security implications of maintaining 
the status quo. 
 
Impacts on the Syrian Refugees  
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The continuation of the status quo with respect to the legal status and socioeconomic 
conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan will no doubt have the most significant consequences on 
the Syrian refugees themselves. As the war continues to rage in Syria, preventing Syrian refugees 
from safely returning home, and as the attitudes toward refugees in the West harden, their 
situation in Jordan will continue to deteriorate if they are not integrated into the Jordanian 
economy and permitted to fully integrate into Jordanian society by becoming Jordanian citizens. 
Broadly speaking, these impacts can be categorized into three main categories: economic 
impacts, psychological and health-related impacts, and social and political impacts.  
 
Economic Impacts 
Both the policy of non-integration and the serious shortfalls in funding for humanitarian and 
development assistance have resulted in serious economic consequences for Syrian refugees in 
Jordan. Both Syrian refugees living in the official refugee camps (Za’atari and Azraq) and Syrian 
refugees living outside of the camps amongst Jordanians in areas such as Amman, Mafraq, and 
Zarqa face serious economic challenges as a result of the crisis itself, the international 
community’s insufficient response to the crisis, and Jordan’s thus far short-sighted policies 
regarding the Syrian refugee crisis. These challenges include problems such as unemployment, 
lack of access to livelihoods, deepening poverty, and, and increased vulnerability. 
The Government of Jordan (GoJ), humanitarian organizations, and charities as well as 
Jordan’s neighbors and “community groups” have “contributed generously” and exerted much 
effort “to maintain the wellbeing and dignity of the refugees,” and “to support the most 
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vulnerable Syrian refugee households.”100 But humanitarian aid and sympathy are not enough.101 
As “needs increase and community coping mechanisms and safety nets” have been nearly 
exhausted, “vulnerabilities” are becoming “exacerbated” and “community tensions” are rising.102 
Syrian refugees need real, durable solutions, not charity and pity.103 
About 85% of the Syrian refugees in Jordan have “settled out of camps, principally in 
Amman, Mafraq, Irbid, and Zarqa,” yet a large proportion of them “are classified as ‘extremely 
vulnerable’.”104 Although “refugee registration gives access to humanitarian assistance and some 
public services, the Syrian refugees have no legal entitlement to work” without a work permit.105 
As a result, “it is the informal sector which provides the opportunities for income generation but 
wages are inevitably very low and working conditions are exploitative.”106 But “income-
generating activities are scarce and for most of them the income-expenditure gap is substantial 
and increasing.”107 According to a “recent food security monitoring exercise,” as much as “three-
quarters of refugee households relied on food vouchers as their main source of income, while in 
host communities 20 per cent of female-headed households scored ‘poor’ or ‘borderline’ in a 
food consumption assessment, compared with 12 per cent in male-headed households.”108 
UNHCR estimates that about “86 per cent of urban refugees live below the Jordanian poverty 
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line of 68 JOD (approx. US$95) per capita per month.” 109  Consequently, “[livelihood] 
sustainability, cost of living and rent levels, alongside food insecurity and increasing 
indebtedness, are major concerns for the refugees as well as for their hosts.”110  
As this crisis has become protracted, many if not most of the Syrian refugees in Jordan “have 
now been cut off from their homes and livelihoods for years, and face increasing vulnerability as 
whatever savings or assets they possessed have been depleted or sold.”111 This “sale of personal 
assets” has become “extensive.”112 The problem is, “this not only increases their current 
impoverishment but depletes the resources that the refugees might have available when and if 
they return to Syria to rebuild their lives and livelihoods.”113  Furthermore, unemployment and 
increasing impoverishment “has disproportionately affected women and youth.”114 There has 
been a “rising incidence of child labour” as well as child marriage, causing a “loss of education 
that will affect their life chances both in exile and when they return to Syria.”115 This has put in 
motion a cycle of poverty. “The costs and impacts of displacement on their livelihoods are severe 
and their marginalisation from the mainstream response programme is particularly worrying.”116 
If Jordan’s policies do not change, the Syrian refugees will keep falling deeper and deeper into 
poverty. 
 
Psychological and Health-Related Impacts 
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Syrian refugees in Jordan have also experiences major psychological and health-related 
issues as a result of the crisis in Syria and their situation in Jordan. The psychological and health-
related issues that many refugees have or are currently experiencing are the result of a 
combination of factors both prior to and after their flight to Jordan from Syria. Some are 
physical, and others psychological. Some are short-term, and others long-term or chronic. Some 
simply concern access to healthcare, and others are in part a result of other challenges that the 
Syrian refugees residing in Jordan face. 
Many of the primary health issues for Syrian refugees are psychological.117 These issues 
include trauma and depression, among other issues.118 As refugees, many suffer from trauma and 
PTSD as a result of the violence they witnessed and suffered back home in Syria. In addition, 
many women and children (and men in some cases) have suffered from sexually and gender-
based violence (SGBV), which has been used as a weapon of war in Syria, during their flight as 
refugees, and/or during their time as refugees in Jordan.119 Furthermore, the stress of refugee 
status in Jordan and the consequent feelings of isolation, marginalization, and lack of belonging; 
the relative deprivation and frustration that refugees experience because of their legal status and 
socioeconomic situation; the feelings of being stuck in limbo because of the protracted nature of 
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the crisis; the feelings of loss of dignity and self worth; and the hopelessness all contribute to 
further trauma, stress, anxiety, and depression. This is not helped by the fact that issues of mental 
illness, trauma, and especially SGBV are still stigmatized and considered taboo in Syrian [and 
Jordanian] society.120 
Another issue is disease.121 Due to the chaos and crumbling healthcare system back in Syria 
as a result of war, many preventable and treatable diseases began to surface, including polio, 
measles, and tuberculosis (TB).122 In addition, due to the overcrowding in the Syrian refugee 
camps in Jordan (specifically Za’atari and Azraq camps) as well as the poor socioeconomic 
conditions of the vast majority of Syrian refugees,123 who live in urban areas,124 the spread of 
viruses, bacterial infections, and diseases is a public health concern as well. 
However, even more troubling than these contagious diseases is the issue of non-
communicable diseases (NCDs). These include diseases such as “hypertension, cardiovascular 
disease, diabetes, chronic respiratory diseases, and arthritis.” This “high prevalence of non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) poses a challenge to in terms of provision of appropriate 
secondary and tertiary services, continuity of care, access to medications, and costs.”125 This, in 
turn, feeds into the next key issue for Syrian refugees—access to adequate healthcare.  
Finally, access to adequate healthcare is a serious challenge for Syrian refugees in Jordan.126 
Several Syrian refugees that I interviewed complained of lack of access to adequate healthcare 
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because of insufficient funds and poor-quality care. For example, Bilqis*, an elderly Syria 
woman from Homs who I interviewed in Amman, has serious heart problems but cannot afford 
her medications nor the nutritional supplements she needs. Nesrin*, a Syrian refugee from Daraa 
that I met in Amman, is a mother of two children with serious developmental disabilities and 
major heart conditions that require surgery. She cannot afford the treatments, and the operation 
her son needs is out of the question because it is so expensive. Another Syrian refugee I met 
named Yasser* and his wife Nadia* from the ancient Roman city of Al-Nakheel similarly faced 
medical challenges. Yasser has a serious disease that causes him to lose his limbs, and he no 
longer has arms or legs. Yet he also cannot access the necessary treatment and medical care 
because he cannot afford it. Nizar*, a father and husband I met in Al Mafraq who is originally 
from Homs, complained that Jordanian healthcare is very expensive and poor quality. He said 
that he had rushed his pregnant wife (she was pregnant when they fled Syria) to the hospital in 
the middle of the night, since she was in labor. He said that when they arrived, all the nurses and 
staff were dancing, listening to music, taking their time, and ignoring the patients. It took them 
hours and hours to get the care she needed. Nizar* explained to me that this never would have 
happened in Syria. First of all, healthcare was free back in Syria, and secondly, staff would never 
be able to get away with overtly ignoring the patients in need of care like what he experienced 
when his wife was in labor. These problems in the healthcare system are the result of several 
factors, including the sheer magnitude of the refugee crisis, persistent underfunding for 
humanitarian assistance, and the strain that the Syrian refugee influx has put on the Jordanian 
healthcare system.  
 
Social and Political Impacts 
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There have also been serious social and political consequences from the ongoing Syrian 
refugee crisis in Jordan and Jordan’s policies toward the Syrian refugees entering the country or 
already within its borders. These consequences are to a large extent cyclically linked with the 
socioeconomic conditions and legal status of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Some examples of 
negative impacts have been social exclusion, increased tension between Syrian refugees and 
Jordanian nationals, and increased child marriage among Syrian refugees.127 The continuation of 
that status quo could bring engender other dangerous outcomes for the Syrian refugees, including 
increased domestic and communal violence; an increase in crime, gangs, sexual and other types 
of harassment; involvement in the black market and consequent increased risk of labor and other 
abused; and increased risk of civil strife between Syrian refugees and Jordanian nationals.128  
Finally, the unsustainable status quo has already forced many Syrian refugees to leave Jordan 
indirectly if not directly in some cases. Some Syrian refugees have been deported back to Syria, 
perhaps in violation of the fundamental principle of non-refoulement “for violating laws, such as 
working illegally,” or “for posing security problems, usually as a result of political actions, 
regardless of specific affiliation.”129 Others have made their own decision to return to Syria 
despite dangerous conditions to participate in the violence or to somehow earn a living.130 Others 
have attempted to migrate elsewhere. Starting a little over a year and a half ago, the world 
witnessed a massive increase in “illegal” and dangerous migration to Europe by boat and 
smuggling routes. If the status quo does not improve, this trend will likely continue. 
 
                                                
127 “JORDAN RESPONSE PLAN for the Syrian Crisis." p. 21 
128 Ibid. 
129 Sarah Bidinger et al., Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility Sharing (Boston, MA: Boston 
University School of Law, International Human Rights Clinic, 2014), 
http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/programs/clinics/international-human-rights/documents/FINALFullReport.pdf. p. 63. 
130 Ibid. p. 68. 
 Rachel Mayer      42
Impacts on the Jordanian Economy and Infrastructure 
That the large influx of Syrian refugees has impacted the Jordan’s economy and 
infrastructure is incontrovertible. It has affected the labor markets, the housing markets, the roads 
and transportation system, the sanitation and sewage systems, the already scarce water supply, 
the healthcare system, the education system, the government’s budget and finances, and the 
overall economy in Jordan. Nevertheless, “Jordan has absorbed refugee flows for well over a 
century.”131 
The UN, various IGNOs and faith-based NGOs, and the international community have been 
assisting the Government of Jordan (GoJ) in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis. However, 
“the nature of the crisis has evolved significantly,” since the onset of the crisis, “even as the 
scope and cost of the operation has continued to expand.”132 The situation morphed from a short-
term humanitarian operation limited to small refugee camps into a nation-wide crisis. “Refugees 
began leaving the camps and settling in some of the poorest municipalities of the northern 
governorates,” which in turn began “placing an unmanageable burden on basic services and 
infrastructure, markets and local communities’ resources.”133 At the start of the crisis, Jordanians 
approached the Syrian refugees with generosity and compassion. But as the situation has become 
protracted and the refugee influx has had an increasing impact on the economy, infrastructure, 
services, and resources, this welcome has worn off to many Jordanians. This has become “a 
protracted systemic crisis in which some of the poorest most vulnerable Jordanians are sharing 
their scarce local resources, services and infrastructure with a growing population of refugees 
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living among them, and increasingly competing for employment, shelter, schooling, water and 
other basic necessities.”134  
Jordan’s finances have been seriously affected as well. “Providing for their [the Syrian 
refugees’] needs has impacted heavily on Jordan’s public finances, increasing government 
expenditure on subsidies, public services, and security, while further compounding the negative 
economic consequences of regional instability.”135 As the crisis is becoming more and more 
protracted, the impacts on Jordan’s public finances are becoming more and more substantial. “In 
some municipalities refugees outnumber residents, and the impact on inflation, employment, and 
access to public services and community resources has fuelled local tensions and threatened to 
spark wider social unrest.”136 These trends will likely continue if there are no changes in policy 
and aid provision.  
There have also been significant impacts on Jordan’s fiscal position and its international 
trade. “Hosting over 1.4 million Syrians has also heavily impacted Jordan’s fiscal position, 
exacerbating pressure on public finances, increasing government expenditure on subsidies for 
bread, water, electricity, and gas, and further inflating the budget deficit.”137 Since the UN 
agencies, INGOs, and local NGOs have faced persistent underfunding throughout the crisis, 
limiting their abilities to provide adequate humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees, Jordan’s 
economic responsibilities and expenditures have increased tremendously. In addition, the “fiscal 
impact has been compounded by interruptions to the flow of relatively cheap gas from Egypt, 
leaving the country with no alternative to expensive oil imports, at an annual cost of 
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approximately US$2 billion.”138 This high cost naturally limits the amount of public funds that 
can go toward other important areas such as infrastructure and public services. On top of this, 
international trade “has been severely disrupted by the loss of the country’s main trans-regional 
trade route through Syria, impeding Jordan’s access to major export markets in Europe.”139 In 
addition, “trade with Iraq - which previously accounted for 20 per cent of total exports (i.e. 
US$1.25 billion in 2013) has fallen by almost 90 per cent since armed groups seized the main 
Iraqi border crossing in June 2014, leading to an additional revenue loss of over US$1.4 million 
per day.”140 The ongoing war in Syria and the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan have seriously 
affected Jordan’s finances, international trade, and overall economy. 
Nevertheless, while it is true that the “Syrian refugee influx has compounded existing 
problems associated with large numbers of migrant workers in Jordan,” as well as Jordan’s fiscal 
concerns, these challenges have been exacerbated by the fact that Syrian refugees are not 
permitted to work legally.141 There already are “large numbers of irregular migrant workers who 
are subject to discrimination and abuse,” and these numbers have increased as Syrian refugees 
have started to work illegally, creating a more permissible climate for labor abuses and 
exploitation and eliminating the incentive “to improve the wages and quality of work” 
throughout the labor market but especially in low-skilled jobs.142 This in turn has been driving 
down wages and standards throughout the labor market for both migrant workers (and Syrian 
refugees) and Jordanian nationals. Furthermore, since Syrian refugees are not permitted to work 
legally, they are more dependent on both government services and international humanitarian 
assistance, which weighs down on Jordan’s finances as well as donor contributions from the 
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international community. If Syrian refugees are not permitted to work legally, these negative 
economic trends and consequent social tensions will continue to increase, negatively impacting 
both Syrian refugees and Jordanian nationals.  
The Syrian refugee crisis has impacted not only the Jordanian economy, but also every aspect 
of the Jordanian infrastructure and government services. This includes a range of areas, including 
the education system, the healthcare system, local governance and municipal services, the energy 
sector, the environment, the justice system, shelter, transportation, and WASH.  Concerns for the 
education system include “overcrowding in high population density areas, shortages of qualified 
teachers, and concerns about declining quality.”143 In addition, the “health sector urgently 
requires the continuation of humanitarian assistance to cope with the immediate health needs of 
refugees, while simultaneously strengthening systems to maintain and restore quality and extend 
coping capacity for future inflows.”144 In addition, the “influx of Syrian refugees has exacerbated 
municipalities’ already limited capacities to meet local needs and address social cohesion within 
communities,” and this “situation is exacerbated by their severe financial distress overall.”145 
In terms of energy, the gas crisis “has been compounded by the increased demand from 
Syrian refugees, with total residential energy consumption rising from 4926 GWh in 2009 to 
6265 GWh in 201312.”146 In order to “offset increased demand and reduce pressure on the power 
grid,” Jordan must urgently address “energy efficiency and renewable energy supply measures in 
addition to improvements in capacity.”147  
As for the environment, “short-term responses to the refugee crisis and resilience-building 
measures such as new construction risk deleterious consequences for the environment,” 
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especially in “already resource-scarce and environmentally fragile country like Jordan.”148 
“Technical assistance and support” will thus prove necessary “to ensure that environmental 
impact assessments (EIA) are undertaken to incorporate the appropriate mitigation measures 
within the design of projects, preventing damage to the environment while addressing risks to 
social cohesion and well-being.”149 
The refugee crisis has also affected the justice system. “Competition for access to public 
services and scarce resources has fuelled tensions and social conflict, which can be considered as 
one of the key reasons for a marked increase in juvenile delinquency and crime rates.”150 The 
caseload has increased by “50 per cent in Amman, 77 per cent in Irbid, and 84 per cent in Mafraq 
during the period 2011-2014” according to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ).151 This has seriously 
impacted “the technical and operational capacity of the judicial system.”152  
Housing has also been affected. “The increased demand has led to increased rental prices, 
sub-division of existing units, and conversion of outbuildings into rental accommodation.”153 
Areas with the highest influx of refugees have been most severely impacted, with “rental prices 
inflated by 100 per cent to 200 per cent compared to pre-crisis value prices thereby causing an 
increase in sub-standard solutions and growth of informal settings.”154 Since most refugees live 
in host communities, “competition for affordable housing has become a leading source of 
community tension.”155 
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“The influx of refugees has also heavily impacted Jordan’s transport infrastructure, 
particularly in areas with high concentrations of refugees.”156 This is due to both the provision of 
humanitarian assistance and the increase in population and new unplanned settlements. 
“Servicing refugees’ needs has increased the pressure on transport networks, multiplying the 
volume of heavy-loaded cargo, water supply, and sludge disposal trucks, while further 
contributing to the rapid degradation of the roads.”157 There is also a need for new road and 
better transit in areas “where unplanned settlements have sprung up throughout municipalities in 
the north as a result of refugee arrivals.”158 
Finally, the “water infrastructure is in need of urgent rehabilitation to increase water quality 
and accessibility.”159 Due to increasing demand, the frequency of water delivery has become 
insufficient and is worsening, and as a result, “households have to supplement their supply by 
purchasing water.”160 The sanitation and sewage systems have also been impacted. “The influx 
of Syrian refugees has also increased pressure on already limited sewage and communal waste 
systems, which only cover 62 per cent of the Jordanian population.”161 Plus, the refugee camps 
must not be forgotten: “water and sanitation will continue to be needed throughout 2015 in 
refugee camps.”162 
Given the increasingly protracted nature of this crisis, “there is a growing acknowledgment 
that current life-saving humanitarian funding and programming are neither sustainable nor 
sufficient, and should be complemented by a more development-oriented approach to build 
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national resilience and sustain the level and quality of services provided.”163 However, if the 
status quo continues, Jordan will likely see the negative impacts on its economy and 
infrastructure worsen far more than they would if there was a policy shift towards development 
and integration.  
Some organizations and agencies are starting to shift from a strictly humanitarian approach to 
a more development-focused approach. For example, UNICEF is starting to shift its focus 
towards development and improving “social cohesion” between Syrian refugees and Jordanian 
nationals and is working to integrate their programs into the broader development agenda for 
Jordan. UNICEF operates based on a model that incorporates both development and 
humanitarian assistance by incorporating its programs into four cyclical phases—development, 
crisis, recovery, and development. A staff member that I interviewed at UNICEF argued that the 
Syrian refugee influx in Jordan is not necessarily a burden economically, as there is some 
economic growth and increased development funding, and there is a new initiative to set up 
special economic zones wherein Syrian refugees will be able to work. However, she maintained 
that this crisis has placed a huge burden on the schools, transit, and infrastructure and that Jordan 
cannot and should not be expected to shoulder this responsibility on its own. 
Some other organizations, including some local organizations, recognize the risks of 
maintaining the status quo of non-integration and marginalization of Syrian refugees for both 
Syrian refugees and Jordanians and are actively working to change the trajectory of these trends 
through integrated development for both Syrians and Jordanians. For example, a very new local 
Jordanian NGO called Blue Umbrella aims to “Build civil society of underdevelopment areas 
affected by the impact of asylum through capacity building and development for local nonprofits 
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and build networks of peers and promote resource sharing to drive effectively all civil society 
components in order to maximize their positive change in the community, in turn generating 
more resources for local nonprofits.”164 The organization intends to target local nonprofit 
organizations, youth activists, and community leaders among both Jordanian and Syrian 
communities in order to empower marginalized and hard-hit communities, increase local 
capacity among current and future community leaders, and promote harmony, unity, and 
prosperity for everyone living in Jordan.165 Although this organization was just established this 
year, it is the first local organization I found while in Jordan that both recognizes the dangers of 
maintaining the status quo and is actively attempting to address these issues through long-term 
strategies rather than through protracted humanitarian assistance, increased resettlement, and 
encouraging the repatriation of Syrian refugees in Jordan to Syria. 
 
Security Concerns 
Refugee influxes do not only impact the economies of host countries; they also present 
potential security concerns for host countries. There is a large body of literature in political 
science, comparative politics, conflict studies, political psychology, urban studies, geography, 
and security studies concerning radicalization, political violence and militarization among 
refugees. One of the most basic arguments is based on Ted Gurr’s classic frustration-aggression 
theory: perceived relative deprivation yields frustration, which can shift to aggression and 
violence given the right preconditions and a spark.166 In the context of refugee crises, this 
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argument can be applied as follows: if refugees perceive relative deprivation as compared to the 
host community in the host country in the form of economic disparities, disparities in the 
provision of rights, discrimination, or other such disparities, then, given the right circumstances 
and a spark, they may turn to aggression and violence (individually or collectively).  
Bueno de Mesquita et al. add an important analysis to this discussion in The Logic of 
Political Survival. They argue that political leaders do whatever is necessary to stay in power by 
relying on and catering to the “winning coalition”, or the group of people that supports them and 
keeps them in power.167 This is true in all political regimes, no matter if they are democratic, 
semi-democratic, or non-democratic.168 Since the Syrian refugees in Jordan are denied the same 
rights as Jordanian nationals and, most importantly in this case, are denied civil and political 
right, they cannot be part of the Jordanian government’s “winning coalition” needed to maintain 
political power. Thus, in order to have any chance of influencing politics, the Syrian refugees 
will have to force their way into that “winning coalition.” If Syrian refugees continue to face 
marginalization and are denied their human rights, including their civil and political rights, they 
may turn to violence to force their way into the “winning coalition” and gain a political voice. 
Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch contend that “the presence of refugees and 
displaced populations can also increase the risk of subsequent conflict in host and origin 
countries” because refugees can “expand rebel social networks” and, “although the vast majority 
of refugees never directly engage in violence, refugee flows may facilitate the transnational 
spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies conductive to conflict.”169 The spillover of refugees 
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can, based on their study, correlate with conflict spillover.170 Refugee flows in this sense can be 
fundamentally destabilizing to host countries, not just economically as the literature on economic 
“burdens” or impacts might suggest, but also politically and in terms of domestic and regional 
security. 
Yet it is important to recognize that, one, as Salehyan and Gleditsch stated, most refugees 
never participate in violence, and two, not all refugee populations collectively employ violence. 
Some refugee groups militarize, and some do not, despite the prevalent fear that militarization is 
not only possible, but perhaps inevitable. In his study of militarization or lack thereof among 
Palestinian and Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Lebson argues that “four conditions are necessary and 
sufficient to lead to refugee militarization in a particular host country at a particular time: a 
collective project to redeem the homeland from a clear enemy, socioeconomic marginalization 
from the host state, militancy entrepreneurs and political opportunity.”171 He summarizes his 
results as follows: 
From 2010 to 2011 I conducted 174 interviews of Palestinian and Iraqi households and local 
experts in Jordan. The results of these interviews reveal that from 1948 to 1963 there was a 
collective project among Palestinians in Jordan, but most refugees were waiting for powerful 
states to redeem the homeland on their behalf. From 1964 to 1970 all four conditions were 
met. From 1971 to 2011 militarization has not occurred mainly due to lack of political 
opportunity. This suggests that Palestinians would likely militarize again if political 
opportunity arose. Among ordinary Iraqis, however, there is little collective project, despite 
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the presence of militancy entrepreneurs, so it is unlikely that they would militarize even if 
given the opportunity.172 
The question is, does the group Syrian refugees in Jordan fit Lebson’s four conditions? It 
could be argued that Syrian refugees do in fact fit the first of Lebson’s conditions. There are 
“clear enemies” for Syrian refugees back home—the Assad regime and Da’esh—and in addition, 
there has been a “collective project to redeem the homeland” from these enemies in the form of 
the revolution against the Assad regime (despite the factionalism, militarization, weakness, and 
polarization that have developed since 2011). As for the second condition, Syrian refugees are 
certainly facing “socioeconomic marginalization” in Jordan, given that they are not even legally 
permitted to work in Jordan. Militancy entrepreneurs have already been seen in various 
capacities among the Syrian refugees in Jordan, as the Free Syria Army has had significant 
support from refugees and FSA fighters have crossed back and forth over the Syrian borders into 
Jordan and elsewhere for medical treatment.173 The last one of Lebson’s conditions is “political 
opportunity.” This part is hard to measure, but the meaning is clear. The first three conditions are 
preconditions for violence, or fuel if you will. The fourth condition is the spark. Given the right 
circumstances, violence can flare up if the other three conditions are met, according to Lebson’s 
argument. If marginalization continues for the Syrian refugees in Jordan and there is some spark 
or trigger, then, based on Lebson’s argument, there is a real risk that the Syrian refugees may 
turn to violence.  
In another piece, Lebson develops “a comprehensive theory of refugee militarization that 
emphasizes the importance of endogenous factors, including political and economic motivations, 
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in the context of broader structural factors, including political opportunities and resource 
mobilization, mediated by the presence of militancy entrepreneurs” to “helps integrate the 
motivation of refugees, and the discursive framing used by militancy entrepreneurs to mobilize 
them, with capacity for militant activity.” 174  Importantly, Lebson lists “improving living 
conditions, employment opportunities and legal rights of refugees in the host state to meet the 
terms of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, regardless of whether the host 
state is a signatory” and facilitating “economic integration in the host state” among his policy 
prescriptions to reduce the likelihood of militarization among refugee groups.175 
Building on this “refugee warriors” literature, Leenders finds that there is “a serious 
divergence between theorizing on refugee warriors and the important case of Iraq's war 
refugees.”176 Importantly, Leenders questions the salience of this “refugee literature” and “argues 
that the generalized application of the refugee warrior label and the overstated prominence given 
to it by some scholars and by practitioners within the international refugee regime need to be 
critically examined.”177 These assumptions and the application of “the refugee warrior label” 
have already had major consequences. “In reference to Iraqi refugees' abandonment in terms of 
protection and given strenuous efforts to contain them to the region, it is suggested that the label 
appears to have gained currency with the effect of helping to impose an ‘in-region solution’ for 
refugees and drastically curbing refugees' access to direct asylum procedures in North America 
and Western Europe.”178  
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The relatively small number of Syrian refugees that have been resettled or that have been 
granted asylum in the U.S. and much of the E.U. perhaps suggests that policymakers in the West 
may be basing their refugee policies largely on the “overstated prominence” and “generalized 
application” of the refugee warrior literature with respect to Syrian refugees. But, given the case 
of Iraqi refugees, these policies should likewise be critically assessed.  
In sum, the risks posed by non-integration of refugees are significant. It is true that refugee 
studies and policies toward Syrian refugees not just in Jordan but also in states throughout the 
world are already becoming highly securitized. Yet the policies of encampment, non-integration, 
and isolation, which are often put in place for security reasons, often have the opposite effect, 
increasing rather than decreasing security risks. In spite of the seeming dangers of integration, 
non-integration may pose a similar if not greater risk to Jordan, its neighbors, and the 
international community.  
The Jordanian government, mukhaberat, and military are certainly aware of these potential 
threats, as evidenced by the significant military presence in northern Jordan near the Syrian 
border and the seeming ubiquity of the mukhaberat, not just in Amman, but also in Al Mafraq, 
Irbid, and other places throughout the country. However, the current securitization of the Syrian 
refugee issue, the heavy monitoring of Syrian refugees, and the sheer size and reach of the 
security sector is increasing the levels of frustration and deprivation among Syrian refugees and 
is not addressing root causes despite ensuring day-to-day security for Jordanians and tourists and 
preventing immediate terrorist threats from materializing. In the city of Al Mafraq, I observed 
more military vehicles full of soldiers than I did civilian vehicles on the streets. The very air and 
vibe in Al Mafraq felt tense and highly militarized and securitized. People in Al Mafraq were 
afraid to speak openly, and every conversation I had in public lasted less than ten minutes. 
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Almost all of the Syrian refugees I interviewed, whether in Al Mafraq or in Amman, mentioned 
being monitored by the mukhaberat, facing restrictions on their freedom of movement not just 
across international borders—Syrian refugees that leave Jordan will lose their status and will not 
be able to return—but also in Jordan itself as well as their deep fear of deportation should they be 
caught working illegally, commit a minor misdemeanor, or even just be caught at the wrong 
place at the wrong time. Many of the  Syrian refugees that I interviewed explained that many 
Syrian refugees are not permitted to leave the refugee camps legally, especially Azraq camp, and 
furthermore that those caught working illegally will first be forcibly sent to Azraq camp and 
fined 5,000 JD then deported back to Syria if caught again or deported back to Syria right away 
depending on the case.  
But what struck me as even more worrisome was the security sector’s seeming obsession 
with preventing Christian proselytization. Proselytization is illegal in Jordan (preaching Islam is 
legal, but preaching other religions is illegal), and it is also illegal for Muslims to convert to 
Christianity or another religion in Jordan. A minister I met in Amman explained to me that his 
church is heavily monitored and that Christian charity groups working with Syrian refugees are 
especially monitored because, whether or not they are missionary groups, the mukhaberat 
assume they are missionaries. Furthermore, one of the Syrian refugees I interviewed in Al 
Mafraq named Reem* explained to me that the mukhaberat monitor who comes to talk with 
them, and if they are Christian groups, even Christian humanitarian organizations and charities 
like WVI, Caritas, or JRS, or even if they are just friends, they are told not to speak with those 
organizations or individuals again.  
While these approaches do have short-term benefits for Jordan by preventing terrorists 
attacks from materializing and by preventing the spread of Christianity, which seems to be 
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seriously over-prioritized in Jordan to the point where it has become more important than the 
basic dignity and livelihoods of the Syrian refugees, these approaches may do more harm than 
good in the long term for Jordan as well as in the immediate sense for the Syrian refugees living 
in Jordan. With continuing and increasing frustration, anger, and hopelessness among Syrian 
refugees as well as an increased sense of repression, it is clear that the risks posed by the non-
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CHAPTER 3: INTEGRATION AND A PATHWAY TO CITIZENSHIP 
 
I urge you to celebrate the extraordinary courage and contributions of refugees, past and present.179 
 
-- United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, June 20, 2002 
 
Sahar* fled Homs a little over three years ago and came to Jordan via Iraq through the long 
desert route.180 Her husband passed away and she has seven children. Back in Syria, she had run 
a clothing business out of her home, but in Jordan, Syrians cannot work legally. She spent a short 
time in Za’atari but now lives in Amman. Sahar* complained that when she first arrived in 
Za’atari, UNHCR treated them terrible, “like slaves,” and in an inhumane manner by forcing 
them to be out in the hot sun or out in the snow freezing.181 UNHCR denied her refugee status 
three times because her husband was a soldier, even though she is completely anti-war and does 
not support any militant or terrorist group. She left Za’atari as soon as she could. However, she 
explained that over time, things have gotten better for her because she now has a proper ID card 
and legal status in Jordan. Nevertheless, her greatest fear, needless to say, is deportation back to 
Syria. 
The most important thing to Sahar* was that she and her children escaped imminent death in 
Syria.182 However, she worries about how the current situation is affecting her children and about 
their futures. Currently, four of her seven children are not in school. One of them is working 
illegally in construction (floors and tiles). She is terrified that he will either be forcibly sent to 
Azraq Camp or deported back to Syria if caught. With the effects of the trauma from the horrors 
back in Syria on top of the difficult situation in Jordan half of her kids out of school, one 
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working illegally, no father around, and no immediate hopes of legal employment or social 
integration, Sahar* fears for her children and what such deprivation and desperation could 
engender in the future. 
In addition to this, Sahar* told me how grateful she was that Jordan was safe and stable and 
that she could lead a somewhat normal life here.183 She said that she is terrified of being sent 
back to Syria and that there is nothing for her and no future for her children there. However, she 
does want to stay in Jordan for perhaps permanently. Sahar* stressed that she is happy here in 
Jordan and is thankful for Jordan’s generosity in opening its doors to so many Syrians, but all she 
wants is to be treated with dignity and afforded the same civil rights and human rights as 
Jordanian citizens.  
 
The Need for Integration and a Pathway to Citizenship 
Given the protracted nature of the war in Syria and the Syrian refugee crisis as well as the 
situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan and the sheer size of the population, the option of 
integration and the provision of a pathway to citizenship for Syrian refugees in Jordan should be 
seriously considered and prioritized. The present situation for Syrian refugees in Jordan has 
become unsustainable, and inaction or continuation of the status quo of non-integration could 
lead to serious consequences not only for the Syrian refugees themselves, but also for Jordanians. 
Integration and a pathway to citizenship would not only improve the situation of Syrian refugees 
in Jordan, especially with respect to their human rights, but it would also help mitigate some of 
the negative consequences that the Syrian refugee crisis has had on Jordan and slow or even 
reverse the negative economic, social, and political trends in Jordan. Assuming that one, the war 
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in Syria will continue and that the Syrian refugees will not be able to return home, and two, that 
refugee resettlement continues to account for a only a tiny percentage of the refugee population, 
then integration, a path to citizenship, and the provision of equal rights is the best solution for 




The influential theoretical literature continues to be relevant to refugee studies today as well 
as to the current Syrian refugee crisis. Hannah Arendt’s famous work on rights and statelessness 
in The Origins of Totalitarianism, particularly  “Chapter Nine: The Decline of the Nation-State 
and the End of the Rights of Man,” continues to be studied as the preeminent philosophical 
foundation of refugee studies and refugee law.184 In her discussion of the massive displacement 
of peoples in the aftermath World War I, Arendt deftly illustrates the core of the problem that 
refugees continue to face today: 
Civil wars which ushered in and spread over the twenty years of uneasy peace were not only 
bloodier and more cruel than all their predecessors; they were followed by migrations of 
groups who, unlike their happier predecessors in the religious wars, were welcomed nowhere 
and could be assimilated nowhere. Once they had left their homeland they remained 
homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of 
their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth.185  
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The human rights regime, based on Arendt’s analysis, was based on the nation-state system and 
the ability of individuals to claim rights from the state in which they held citizenship. Without 
citizenship, individuals would be “deprived of their human rights” because they would have no 
access to a state from which to claim rights. Arendt further illustrates further consequences of 
statelessness in the world of nation-states: 
Much worse than what statelessness did to the time-honored and necessary distinctions 
between nationals and foreigners, and to the sovereign right of states in matters of 
nationality and expulsion, was the damage suffered by the very structure of legal national 
institutions when a growing number of residents had to live outside the jurisdiction of these 
laws and without being protected by any other. The stateless person, without right to 
residence and without the right to work, had of course constantly to transgress the law. He 
was liable to jail sentences without ever committing a crime. More than that, the entire 
hierarchy of values which pertain in civilized countries was reversed in his case. Since he 
was the anomaly for whom the general law did not provide, it was better for him to become 
an anomaly for which it did provide, that of the criminal…As a criminal even a stateless 
person will not be treated worse than another criminal, that is, he will be treated like 
everybody else. Only as an offender against the law can he gain protection from it...The same 
man who was in jail yesterday because of his mere presence in this world, who had no rights 
whatever and lived under threat of deportation, or who was dispatched without sentence and 
without trial to some kind of internment because he had tried to work and make a living, may 
become almost a full-fledged citizen because of a little theft…He is no longer the scum of the 
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earth but important enough to be informed of all the details of the law under which he will be 
tried. He has become a respectable person.186 
This inversed system of legal incentives for the stateless proved detrimental to both the stateless 
individuals residing in a given state and for the state itself. Those whose mere existence was 
considered illegal often were only able to gain the rights of citizens after committing a criminal 
offense. Finally, she concludes by explaining the danger of such a paradox: 
The paradox involved in the loss of human rights is that such loss coincides with the instant 
when a person becomes a human being in general-without a profession, without a 
citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and specify himself-and 
different in general, representing nothing but his own absolutely unique individuality which, 
deprived of expression within and action upon a common world, loses all significance.187 
In a world in which human rights have become more and more accepted as the basis upon which 
states in the international system should be built and the legal body to which we should all be 
bound, the trends of displacement, forced migration, and statelessness continue to rise. The result 
is a continuous paradox. 
 
Legal Reasons 
Fortunately, there has been significant progress since Arendt wrote The Origins of 
Totalitarianism. The most essential of these changes have been the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Optional Protocol. Although not afforded the full set of 
rights afforded to citizens, the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Optional Protocol do 
stipulate the provision of limited rights to refugees, including lawful residence and the key 
                                                
186 Ibid. p. 286. 
187 Ibid. p. 302. 
 Rachel Mayer      62
principle of non-refoulement, as well as other important rights such as property rights, rights of 
association, access to courts, wage-earning employment and self-employment, housing, public 
education, and freedom of movement.188 
There has also been significant progress in terms of human rights in general that can and 
should apply to all individuals, including to refugees. These include the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in addition to a number of other international human 
rights treaties (of which there are a total of 18).  
Nevertheless, not all states have signed and ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 
1967 Optional Protocol. Importantly, Jordan, like many other Arab states, has not ratified the 
Refugee Convention or its Optional Protocol.189 However, there have been developments in the 
Arab World with respect to refugees, embodied in two important documents that have been 
adopted: “(1) the Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab 
World, which was adopted in November 1992; and (2) the Arab Convention on Regulating the 
Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries, adopted by the League of Arab States in 1994.”190 
But this is just the surface of international refugee law and refugee studies. There has been a 
great deal of scholarship on interpreting international refugee law, assessing its effectiveness, 
critiquing the narrow definition of “refugee” provided in the Refugee Convention, and 
suggesting additions or alternatives to the current interpretations of international refugee law.  
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A key development was of course Goodwin-Gill's famous work was published in 1996.”191 
However, Piotrowicz is correct in saying that much “has happened since the 2nd edition of 
Goodwin-Gill's famous work was published in 1996”192 in terms of both developments in 
international refugee law and the ever-changing realities on the ground.193 In terms of refugee 
law, some key developments include the fact that “subsidiary, or complementary, protection is 
now well established in many countries as a way of granting international protection to those 
who do not qualify for refugee status (or perhaps to avoid granting refugee status).”194 
Additionally, there are now “Guidelines on Internally Displaced Persons.”195 What is more, 
“UNHCR has started to take more of an interest in the plight of stateless people.”196 But 
developments in refugee law to cope with changing realities have also occurred alongside new 
and challenges for refugees, forced migrants, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and host 
countries. Interestingly, the new cover for the 2007 edition197 includes “a photograph of the 
massed tents of a refugee camp,” which at first glance may seem insignificant, but in fact is 
highly significant.198 In fact, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam are “making a point here, that while for 
many western countries the refugee issue involves argument and debate over who is a refugee, 
what is a particular social group, or who is entitled to complementary protection, the reality of 
refugees for many other countries, especially in Africa and Asia, is how to cope with tens of 
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thousands of people fleeing armed conflicts and various natural calamities?”199 The cover 
reflects this changing global reality.  
“It is commonplace to state that refugee law faces a severe crisis.”200 This is in part because 
refugee law has not fully adapted to the fast-moving changes in the realities facing refugees, 
forced migrants, IDPs, and host states. But there is also increasing discontent with refugee law 
and the benefits it brings to host states and particularly states in which individuals seek asylum 
status. “Increasingly, refugee status is seen merely as an alternative path to immigration.”201 Like 
the immigration debate in the U.S. and in other countries, the issue of asylum has also become 
highly politicized and “ideologically charged.”202  In fact, despite the sound arguments and clear 
evidence that immigration can be beneficial, and particularly economically beneficial, for the 
host country, xenophobia and resentment towards immigrants and refugees has increased in 
many places. Yet “anti-immigration propaganda does not seem to be based on sound economic 
argument, but on a mysterious pursuit of national homogeneity,” an identity which in reality is 
nearly impossible to define in a homogenous manner in any case.203 There is thus “inherent 
tension between immigration control and refugee law,” which although highly relevant today is 
certainly not new but rather “can be traced back to the origins of refugee law in the 20th 
century.”204 But what make this issue different today are the consequences for refugees in the 
face of increased immigration controls. Nathwani quotes John Stoessinger here, who argues that, 
“What distinguishes the refugee of the twentieth century is the immense difficulty, and often the 
impossibility of finding a new home”—a difficulty which Nathwani terms “restrictive 
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immigration policy.”205 Consequently, many states have overt strategies to limit “the scope of the 
refugee concept”, the definition of a refugee, and the application of international refugee law 
when it comes into conflict with its domestic immigration law.206 
Despite the apparent goals of the Refugee Convention and its Optional Protocol and the 
human rights stipulated in the Refugee Convention and its Optional Protocol (as well as in the 18 
human rights treaties), there is decreasing respect for the human rights of refugees. 
In an era where States are increasingly challenging the logic of simply assimilating refugees 
to their own citizens, questions are now being raised about whether refugees should be 
allowed to enjoy freedom of movement, to work, to access public welfare programs, or to be 
reunited with family members. Doubts have been expressed about the propriety of exempting 
refugees from visa and other immigration rules, and whether there is a duty to admit 
refugees at all.207 
Hathaway worries that “international refugee law is profoundly misunderstood” and “that 
erroneous and competing claims by governments and the refugee advocacy community about the 
structure and purpose of refugee law threaten its continuing ability to play a truly unique human 
rights role at a time when no meaningful alternative is in sight.”208 This is especially evident for 
Hathaway in a number of host countries in the developing world where refugees live in a 
precarious limbo: 
In particular, governments of the developed world are now appropriating the language of 
burden-sharing in order to further an only mildly attenuated global apartheid regime under 
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which most refugees not only remain in the less developed world, but remain there under 
conditions which are generally rights-abusive and often literally life-threatening. These 
states have distorted the true object and purpose of the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’), erroneously suggesting that it sets only protection 
obligations of ‘last resort’ — that is, that refugees may be routinely sent away to any other 
state that will admit them without risk of return to their country of origin.209 
Moreover, "these same governments have sought to justify their harsh—and often illegal—
treatment of refugees arriving at their territory on the grounds that such harshness is the 
necessary means to a more rational protection end."210 This of course “is largely a distortion of 
international refugee law.”211  
Hathaway recognizes that there is "no doubt that the burdens and responsibilities of offering 
protection to refugees are today unfairly apportioned,” as "more than 90 per cent of refugees 
remain in the less developed world, and some states are “hosting more than one refugee for every 
100 citizens."212 In addition, these same states have host such vast numbers of refugees with far 
fewer resources and significantly smaller budgets.213  “Furthermore, not even that tiny budget is 
guaranteed, but has to be garnered each year from voluntary contributions to the UNHCR of a 
small number of wealthier countries — there is no formula-based funding arrangement."214 Thus, 
"it should come as no surprise that the living conditions of refugees in less developed host 
countries are often dire" under such circumstances.215 Hathaway concludes by arguing that “the 
official rhetoric surrounding refugee law reform is largely unhelpful” but that refugee law is still 
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relevant because it "is clearly attentive to state interests" but also "is anchored in a recognition 
that most refugees today do not enjoy the rights which refugee law formally guarantees them — 
either because they have no access to a safe state, or the safe state to which they are able to travel 
is either not really safe or forces them to languish without hope of regaining any meaningful 
measure of autonomy in their lives."216  
Unlike international human rights law and humanitarian law, refugee law has not developed 
much over time to fit changing circumstances despite the increasing need for legal 
development.217 This fact leads to an important question: “why has greater regard for human 
rights failed to be accompanied by a corresponding respect for refugee rights?”218  The answer is 
in part the reality that refugee influxes come with costs to the host states, and those states have 
become “disinclined to embark upon the development and codification of new rules which can 
only mean taking on and carrying out even more exacting obligations than those that already 
exist.”219 Consequently, “the international community has developed a hybrid regime,” known as 
the refugee protection regime, “which is applied on an ad hoc basis for as long as a given crisis 
endures.”220   
Using the Iraqi refugee crisis as an important case study, Alborzi establishes that “there exist 
serous lacunae in the international mechanism of refugee protection and that, in the absence of a 
modern contractual basis for an enhanced level of protection, the international community has 
tried innovative ways and means to bridge the gaps, although not always very successfully.”221 
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Alborzi furthermore argues that, “the conventional definition of refugees as reflected in hard-law 
instruments is not up-to-date and relevant” and “is therefore no longer applicable to the needs of 
our time.”222 Non-refoulement is a key principle established by the Refugee Convention, 
however, “it is the same principle which has also turned out to be the main obstacle to a modern 
contractual definition of refugees, as states show greater resistance to any broadening of its 
initial scope.”223 To Alborzi, refugee law has lost much of its relevance and must be reformed to 
fit today’s realities. 
However, in spite of the ongoing debates among legal scholars regarding the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol, progressively changing legal interpretations of these documents, and 
the necessity of reforming international refugee law, there are still clear legal reasons supporting 
integration and a pathway to citizenship for refugees. Regardless of the shortcomings in 
international refugee law, the Refugee Convention (and Protocol) do stipulate several human 
rights principles (in addition to those principles stipulated in the various human rights treaties) to 
which state signatories must adhere and strive towards, including non-discrimination (Article 3), 
right of association (Article 15), access to courts (Article 16), wage-earning employment (Article 
17), self-employment (Article 18), housing (Article 21), public education (Article 22), labour 
legislation and social security (Article 24), freedom of movement (Article 26), identity papers 
(Article 27), travel documents (Article 28), non-refoulement (Article 33), and naturalization 
(Article 34).224 
 Thus the goals of the Refugee Convention and Protocol are to ensure the protection of 
refugees’ human rights and to promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees if and when it is 
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safe to do so, the integration of refugees into the host country / country of first asylum, and/or the 
integration of refugees into a third country to which they are resettled. Moreover, as one of the 
most signed onto and ratified treaties, the Refugee Convention and Protocol are now considered 
part of customary international law. With this in mind, all states, whether or not they have signed 




The literature focused on the economic side of refugee studies tends to focus on either the 
“burden”225 or impact of hosting refugees or the need to shift from a humanitarian assistance 
framework to a development framework. The potential economic impacts of hosting refugees 
must be studied critically not just from the perspective of a “burden” on the host country, but 
also from the potential assets refugees may present to the host country and to the region as a 
whole. 
There is a growing realization that the humanitarian framework is insufficient and 
unsustainable for protracted refugee crises. Hosting refugees in the traditional humanitarian 
sense—non-integration, refugee camps, and protracted humanitarian assistance—is very 
expensive, highly reliant on donor states, and economically inefficient. Furthermore, since 
refugees in these situations are often entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance due to legal 
restrictions against employment and equal access to public education and healthcare in host 
countries—most major host countries are not signatories to the Refugee Convention and 
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Protocol—they place a high cost on the domestic and global economies without being able to 
contribute to the economy in which they live. In this traditional understanding, refugees do in 
fact represent a burden on the domestic and global economies as well as the domestic 
infrastructure, education system, and healthcare system. However, this traditional humanitarian 
understanding of refugees does not take into consideration the potential assets that refugees may 
bring to a host country’s economy. It views refugees as objects that simply drain resources rather 
than as human beings with potential, creativity, skills, and a drive for success that can prove 
immensely beneficial to the host country. Thus, there are clear economic reasons to promote the 
integration, or at least the economic integration, of refugees residing in a host country for a 
protracted period of time. 
Several scholars of refugee studies and practitioners argue that humanitarian assistance must 
shift over time into development. As a refugee crisis becomes protracted, humanitarian 
assistance becomes unsustainable. This shift in essence requires that the refugees be integrated at 
least economically into the host country as humanitarian assistance is phased out, and is replaced 
by increased development assistance. This development assistance is then allocated not just to 
the refugees, but also for the communities in which there are refugees and other marginalized 
groups in order to promote development on a communal and national scale.  
One of the reasons why there needs to be a shift to development is donor fatigue: “While 
emergencies may attract a significant amount of funding in assistance to the displaced, long-
standing situations are perceived to have neither the urgency nor likelihood of resolution that 
draw heightened donor interest.”226 This shift requires a paradigm shift among donors and 
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practitioners as well as host countries. “Aleinikoff argues for long-term development solutions 
and a new narrative in addressing protracted displacement, one that emphasizes refugees' 
potential to contribute to host and origin communities through their own human capital, 
transnational connections, and dedicated international assistance.”227  
Yet this is still politically unpopular in host countries. “While the development potential of 
granting refugees the right to work in their host country has been demonstrated, many host 
governments are still reluctant to do so, and taking such solutions to scale will require the buy-in 
of both donor and host governments as well as development agencies.” 228  Humanitarian 
assistance must thus be phased out over time in a protracted refugee crisis as development 
assistance is phased in to assist both the refugee community and the host community. 
Arguing that the current humanitarian model has become unsustainable, some propose 
shifting to development and involving the private sector in coping with the refugee crisis. “At the 
World Economic Forum in 2015, the High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres stated 
that the "international humanitarian community no longer has the capacity to respond," and 
called for a re-imagining of the humanitarian aid model, in which the business sector can play a 
constructive part.”229 Yet this approach may prove challenging despite the good intentions 
behind it: 
The challenge for humanitarian and development actors is to stabilise the precarious 
economic situation, forge a transition from assistance to development, promote economic 
development strategies which support host and refugee communities equitably, and reduce 
the potential for negative economic impacts to exacerbate domestic and regional tensions. At 
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the same time there is the imperative to ensure and enhance a 'protective environment' for 
the refugees.230 
Protection of refugee rights is essential, but so is the shift to development and “the involvement 
and inclusion of host communities in services and infrastructure provision for refugees.”231 
Omar Dahi takes this argument one step further in his application of the need for 
development spending to the Syrian refugee crisis and its impact on Lebanon and Jordan: “The 
most effective way to tackle the Syrian refugee crisis is for neighbouring states to assume a 
leading role in development spending, infrastructure upgrading and job creation, particularly in 
the most underdeveloped regions of those countries.”232 Even though their “line of thinking is 
erroneous, even from a self-interested perspective,” Jordan and Lebanon are both “loath to 
embark on major development spending,” fearing that “substantial investment in refugees will 
provide incentives for further inflows - or integration of existing refugees.”233 Dahi explains that, 
“Shifting to development means investment in upgrading the water, electricity and health 
infrastructure as well as launching projects (perhaps with mixed public and private sector 
involvement) that can generate jobs and alleviate poverty.” He concludes by arguing that:  
Development initiatives administered by the state such as infrastructural investment in 
services, health care, education and job creation, and targeting host communities as well as 
refugees, have the benefit of strengthening state capacity and relieving tensions at the same 
time as addressing refugees' needs. Though large-scale initiatives carry certain risks, so does 
inaction, particularly as both refugee and host communities become increasingly restless.234 
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This last sentence is important. States often think that inaction is a better choice than action 
because it will maintain the status quo. But in refugee crises, the status quo is not as constant as 
it may seem and inaction may only increase the current trends. In the case of the Syrian refugee 
crisis, Syrian refugees are residing in Jordan, and they will continue to impact Jordanian society 
and the Jordanian economy whether the Jordanian government chooses to invest in development, 
chooses another path, or chooses inaction.  
Thus, as Carrion argues,  
Should Syrians be given more opportunities to earn a living legally, both Syrians and the 
Jordanian economy would benefit. Such a move would draw opposition, but the benefits 
would outweigh these costs. In order to minimize the negative political effect, a more open 
livelihoods policy should be accompanied by a significant increase in international 
development support for host communities.235 
However, as Reed explains, “Jordan's original tribal inhabitants have alternatively chafed at and 
welcomed the Palestinians, Iraqis and others, but they acknowledge that the refugees built 
modern Amman too.”236 Perhaps the Syrian refugees could build and develop Za’atari, Mafraq, 
Irbid, and other areas with large numbers of Syrian refugees into thriving local economies as the 
Palestinians built and developed Amman. “Even the Syrians, for all the friction they are creating, 
are contributing to Jordan more than they cost in the goods and services they demand and new 
jobs they create, observers such as the contrarian economist Yusuf Mansur have argued.”237 
Although Syrian refugees are putting strains on the Jordanian economy now, it is possible that, if 
                                                
235 Carrion, “Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Confronting Difficult Truths." p. 2 
236 Reed, “Syrian Refugees Test the Resources of Jordan’s Capital.” 
237 Ibid. 
 Rachel Mayer      74
permitted to work legally and mesh with Jordanians in a national economic development 
strategy, they could become assets to the Jordanian economy in the future.  
Yet shifting to development, in and of itself, will not suffice. There certainly are good 
reasons to promote economic integration and a shift from protracted humanitarian assistance to 
development. “Should Syrians be given more opportunities to earn a living legally,” Carrion 
argues, “both Syrians and the Jordanian economy would benefit,” and “the benefits would 
outweigh these costs” even if this drew domestic opposition.238 These costs must also be taken 
into consideration. Thus, in order “to minimize the negative political effect, a more open 
livelihoods policy should be accompanied by a significant increase in international development 
support for host communities.”239 
However, real economic integration is most successful when coupled with social, political, 
and legal integration. It is not enough to legally permit refugees to participate in the economy; 
there remain immense social and political barriers to equal employment opportunity and 
advancement based on merit, especially when refugees lack civil and political rights in addition 
to economic rights such as the right to work. Thus, if refugees are provided with a pathway to 
citizenship in addition to the right to work and the protection of their basic human rights, then the 
shift from humanitarian assistance to development will be more successful. Full integration will 
allow for the growth of the national economy as a whole, the growth of the middle class, and the 
reduction of poverty and economic marginalization, especially among Syrian refugees and major 
host communities in Jordan. 
 
Security Reasons 
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Security arguments are often made to trump policies that promote human rights. In this way, 
the human rights (both civil and political rights and economic and social rights) of migrants in 
general (including refugees) are often compromised in the name of security. This usually begins 
with a binary of categorization of “us” and “them,” propagated by nativists and popularized by 
fear. The migrant, or in this case refugee population is placed outside of the nativist in-group and 
becomes “them” in this scenario. It is from here that political pundits and nativists begin to make 
sweeping statements about why “they” pose a threat to “us.”  
Yet despite the growing fear of refugees and securitization of the Syrian refugee crisis both 
in Jordan and worldwide, there are important security arguments for promoting integration and a 
pathway to citizenship for Syrian refugees in Jordan. In fact, Syrian refugees and Jordanians 
alike, as well as others in the region and throughout the globe, will likely be safer and better off 
if the Syrian refugees are integrated economically and socially and have the option to become 
Jordanian citizens. 
The maintenance of the status quo of non-integration for Syrian refugees in Jordan poses 
some serious security risks. Furthermore, these risks are even higher if this also entails increased 
encampment, isolation, and marginalization from Jordanian society. There is a great deal of 
literature in political science and refugee studies on the dangers of encampment and collective 
isolation of refugee populations. Sarah Lischer employs the cases such as the Rwandan refugees 
in the Great Lakes region, Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and Bosnian Muslim refugees 
in the Balkans, among other cases, to highlight the risks of refugee militarization, particularly in 
isolated camps in border areas—hence the title of her book Dangerous Sanctuaries.240 From 
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Lischer’s perspective, “refugee crises [can] function as a strategy of war,” especially in the cases 
of “exiled rebel groups,” wherein “a refugee population provides international legitimacy, a 
shield against attack, a pool of recruits, and valuable sources for food and medicine” and 
“refugee camps [in essence] function as rear bases for rebels who attack across the border.”241 
This problem can be mitigated through the discouragement of encampment and isolation and the 
promotion of integration, citizenship, and politics by peaceful rather than violent means. 
But regardless of whether or not encampment continues, non-integration has already 
produced widespread feelings of relative deprivation, and if these trends continue, this growing 
frustration could produce aggression and violence given the right circumstances.242 This violence 
could take many forms, some of which have already begun to rise in Jordan. On a more 
individual level, instances of sexual harassment and SGBV, domestic violence, petty theft, and 
crime have been increasing among Syrian refugees in Jordan. However, there is a potential that 
this could morph into more serious and organized types of violence, including but not limited to 
gang violence, terrorism (domestic, international, and/or transnational), riots and uprisings 
(against the Jordanian state, the GoJ, and/or the Hashemite monarchy), and militarization and 
political violence (inside Jordan, in Syria and/or Iraq, and/or in other places throughout the 
region and the world).  
All of this in turn may lead to the escalation of tensions between Syrian refugees and 
Jordanian nationals and an increased potential of internal strife and even civil war in Jordan. 
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Thus, policies of non-integration pose a severe long-term risk to Jordan’s national security, 
regional security in the Middle East, and possibly even global security.  
Nevertheless, promoting integration, a pathway to citizenship, and naturalization for Syrian 
refugees in Jordan also poses some security risks. One serious risk is backlash and the potential 
for violence and civil strife. Some Jordanians, and particularly those living in poorer areas such 
as Mafraq and Zarqa that have witnessed massive influxes of Syrian refugees, may respond in a 
reactive manner if Syrian refugees are permitted to work, integrated into the economy, and put 
on a path to citizenship. They may see this as both a threat to their jobs and livelihoods and a 
challenge to their Jordanian national identity and respond violently. This in turn could lead to 
frustration on the part of Syrians, especially if they face discrimination despite equality before 
the law (this has been a problem for Palestinians in Jordan), and perhaps violence in response. 
Some other risks posed by integration concern the political arena and the future of Jordanian 
politics. One of these risks is the potential for more popular protests and even revolution for 
democracy and/or regime change. It is important to note that most of the Syrian refugees in 
Jordan are from Daraa, where the Syrian Revolution began in 2011. Although Jordanians have 
already protested in small numbers for similar reasons, Syrians could potentially increase the 
numbers and strength of such a movement. It is possible that their demands for democracy and 
an end to corruption and cronyism in Syria might transfer over to protests against the GoJ and 
the Hashemite Monarchy, but there is no guarantee one way or the other. Moreover, it is 
certainly possible that the Syrian refugees may avoid violent means to achieve their political 
objectives, given the failures they have seen in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. But no one can really 
predict for certain how the Syrian refugees might choose to affect change in Jordan if they even 
choose to act collectively. 
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Another risk of full integration is that the Syrian refugees will likely shift the political 
discourse and policy priorities in Jordan. This is a major concern, particularly for Jordanians that 
are invested in the political status quo. If the Syrian refugees become citizens and are able to vote 
and participate in Jordanian politics (though this is limited since Jordan is a constitutional 
monarchy, not a representative democracy), they may change the political discourse and policy 
priorities, potentially in a way that Jordanians (both East Bankers and those of Palestinian 
descent) may not like. For example, they may shift the priorities from Palestine to Syria, 
especially in the short term. This may anger some Palestinians, particularly those still living in 
camps and receiving aid from UNRWA. Given the large number of Syrian refugees in Jordan 
vis-à-vis Jordanian citizens at the present moment, the Syrian refugees will no doubt have 
significant influence in the political arena if they become citizens and are permitted to participate 
in the political system.  
Yet in spite of the potential risks of integrating Syrian refugees in Jordan and providing a 
pathway to citizenship, the risks posed by non-integration, marginalization, isolation, and 
encampment are significantly greater. Furthermore, the risks posed by integration cannot be fully 
eliminated by non-integration policies. For example, tensions between Syrian refugees and 
Jordanians are already rising, and the potential for civil strife and political violence is increasing, 
not decreasing, as a result of the current approached to the Syrian refugee crisis. As another 
example, the possibility that Syrian refugees will collectivize, mobilize, militarize, and/or rise up 
against the state, the GoJ, or the Hashemite monarchy already exists; this problem will not just 
go away on its own or by isolating the Syrian refugees and continually repressing such 
movements. In the long term, this will continuously pose a threat, especially if the Syrian refugee 
population remains in Jordan and the policies of non-integration do not change. From a national 
 Rachel Mayer      79
security and a global security point of view, Jordan should seriously consider not just economic 
integration and development, but also social integration and a pathway to citizenship for Syrian 
refugees. In the long run, full integration is in Jordan’s national security interest and in the 
international community’s global security interest. 
 
A Global Responsibility to Solve 
Important new literature is emerging on the need for global responsibility sharing243 and the 
“responsibility to solve”244 refugee crises, including but not limited to the Syrian refugee crisis. 
This change in rhetoric and approach is evident particularly among practitioners and at the UN. 
In a statement accompanying the release of UNHCR’s annual report, High Commissioner for 
Refugees António Guterres said, “For an age of unprecedented mass displacement, we need an 
unprecedented humanitarian response and a renewed global commitment to tolerance and 
protection for people fleeing conflict and persecution.”245 Amnesty International went further in 
its criticism of the global response to the refugee crisis and the lack of global responsibility 
sharing, accusing “governments and smugglers alike of pursuing ‘selfish political interests 
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instead of showing basic human compassion.’”246 Secretary General of Amnesty International 
Salil Shetty further stated that,  
The refugee crisis is one of the defining challenges of the 21st century, but the response of 
the international community has been a shameful failure. We need a radical overhaul of 
policy and practice to create a coherent and comprehensive global strategy.247 
In a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace paper on the Syrian refugee crisis in 
Jordan, Alexandra Francis presents four “key takeaways for Jordan and the international 
community”: (1) “Prioritize the integration of development and humanitarian aid;” (2) “Maintain 
protection space for Syrian refugees;” (3) “Formalize access to livelihoods;” and (4) “Empower 
local governance actors.”248 She argues that Jordan “will depend on increased international 
support” in order “to confront its national challenges and continue to provide a safe haven for 
Syrian refugees.”249 
Aleinikoff and Poellot take this one step further, arguing that there must be not just 
international “burden” sharing (or responsibility sharing), but also the international community 
has a “responsibility to solve” protracted refugee situations.250 They begin by explaining that, 
“more than half of the world's nearly twelve million refugees are in protracted refugee situations 
and the vast majority are not on the road to a durable solution.”251 Taking this reality into 
consideration, Aleinikoff and Poellot argue that the international community has a responsibility 
to solve these protracted refugee situations because of (1) “the human harms imposed on those 
left in the limbo of refugee status for an extended period of time,” (2) “the centrality of solutions 
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and the necessity of burden-sharing” that “underlie the international refugee regime,” and (3) 
“specific commitments of members of the UN General Assembly and signatories to the Refugee 
Convention to cooperate with UNHCR  in seeking solutions.”252  Protracted humanitarian 
assistance is not a solution, according to Aleinikoff and Poellot. “The responsibility of the 
international community to refugees is not simply to support camps or other arrangements that 
provide assistance to refugees; it is to end the condition of being a refugee.”253  
Bidinger et al., Crisp and Arif each argue in favor of global responsibility to protect Syrian 
refugees.254  Arif makes this point quite plainly: 
In this refugee crisis, the world community should not be escaped themselves from carrying 
out their minimum responsibility towards the refugees. One fact is very simple: millions of 
Syrians now need prompt and effective global assistance.255 
Crisp puts the issue into perspective, explaining that, 
Confronted with this scenario, many analysts have reached some very gloomy conclusions 
about the Syrian refugee situation. According to an independent review recently published by 
UNHCR, “after three years of humanitarian response to the refugee crisis, the situation has 
reached a critical phase. Refugee vulnerability is increasing. Humanitarian assistance is not 
sustainable at the current level. There are serious and growing protection concerns.”256 
He concludes by explaining that refugee protection in countries already hosting refugees will 
worsen without real global responsibility sharing: “Unless the Syrian refugee emergency is 
                                                
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid. p. 195-196. 
254 Bidinger et al., Protecting Syrian Refugees; Crisp, “Syria’s Refugees”; Arif, “GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY to Protect Syrian 
Refugees.” 
255 Arif, “GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY to Protect Syrian Refugees.” 
256 “The Global Refugee Crisis.” 
 Rachel Mayer      82
treated as a truly global responsibility, we cannot expect hard-pressed countries in the region to 
maintain the generosity they have demonstrated since the crisis erupted.”257 
The report by Boston University law students Bidinger et al. entitled Protecting Syrian 
Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility Sharing closely examines the Syrian 
refugee crisis from both a legal and a policy perspective and presents a series of 
recommendations for each country hosting a large population of Syrian refugees as well as for 
the international community: 
This report makes an urgent call for a global Comprehensive Plan of Action (“CPA”) that 
builds on UNHCR’s recommendation that “the international community...show solidarity 
with countries hosting Syrian refugees in the region by offering resettlement opportunities, 
humanitarian admission places, and family reunification or other forms of admission for 
Syrian refugees.” The recommendations in this report differ somewhat from the 
humanitarian admissions proposal advanced by UNHCR, which asks countries to “admit up 
to 30,000 Syrian refugees on resettlement, humanitarian admission, or other programmes by 
the end of 2014, with a focus on protecting the most vulnerable.” Currently, with three 
million refugees from Syria outside their home territory, resettlement can only be a partial 
solution—restricted as it is to only the most exceptional opportunities for the most vulnerable 
individuals. Countries outside the current host region must begin considering much more 
open policies to allow at least partial integration of Syrians into their states, both to alleviate 
the burden on current host countries, and to prevent the inevitable unfolding of an even 
greater humanitarian and security crisis than is already occurring.258 
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This report recommends not just increased financial support and resettlement of Syrian 
refugees—it also recommends improving local integration policies in host countries.259 The 
combination of all these policies would constitute true global responsibility sharing and would 
result in the best solutions for Syrian refugees, host countries, and the international community. 
From this same set of literature, there is a growing realization that the status quo is 
insufficient. As Huffer and Sheth eloquently articulate, “The recent call for empathy-based 
policies toward refugees substitutes a mercurial, apolitical emotion for a substantive analysis and 
solution to the current crisis.”260 Empathy and a leaning toward human rights is simply not 
enough. Furthermore, they challenge us to recognize that Arendt’s conclusion that the nation-
state is the only real entity from which individuals can claim their human rights and with that 
work to end statelessness and reintegrate forced migrants and refugees into the nation-state 
system: 
Those of us who belong to nations do bear a responsibility to those who do not. Precisely 
because our human rights are secured through our belonging to a nation-state, our 
responsibility to the stateless stems from that fact. It is up to us as peoples who belong to 
nations to push our governments to step up and fulfill their obligations to the stateless not 
through an abstract humanitarian appeal but through the legal and political apparatus of 
our nations. There is no time to wait for the perfect wave of emotion to spring us to action.261 
This is a global responsibility, not just for NGOs, the UN, and nation-states, but also for citizens 
of the world’s nation states to push their governments to take on their fair share of responsibility. 
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Why Integration and a Pathway to Citizenship Should Be Prioritized  
There are a number of other proposals for how to approach the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan 
that stop short of considering integration and a pathway to citizenship. One proposal is based on 
the common assertion that this crisis is not just Jordan’s responsibility but rather is a global issue 
that requires global responsibility. Building on this perspective, some argue that Jordan can and 
should instead depend on global responsibility sharing, increased and sustained support from the 
international community, protracted humanitarian assistance, and increased resettlement. This 
would be based to a large extent on the model of protracted responsibility sharing in Kenya, 
wherein the international community has continued to fund and support humanitarian assistance 
and refugee camps for Somali and other refugees, who are not permitted by the Kenyan 
government to integrate and naturalize, for more than two decades. But there are several major 
problems with this option. One, protracted humanitarianism is very expensive and fiscally 
unsustainable and subject to donor fatigue. Another problem is that this does not address the 
security concerns about hosting large populations of refugees—if anything, prolonged 
encampment and denial of social, economic, civil, and political rights as well as personal and 
collective agency can exacerbate security concerns and increase the likelihood of refugee 
militarization and use of political violence.262 This increased security risk as a result of 
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protracted encampment, relative deprivation, isolation, denial of human rights, and refusal to 
consider integration is perhaps best exemplified by the militarization of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon. Furthermore, the desire to encourage global responsibility and increased resettlement is 
not an excuse for neglecting refugees’ human rights and basic dignity.  
Another common argument is that Jordan cannot afford to integrate Syrian refugees socially 
and politically because they would become a significant minority that could upset the East 
Banker support base of the Hashemite monarchy.  There is some truth to this argument; the East 
Banker base of the Hashemite monarchy has already become a minority, albeit a large one, and if 
the current trends continue, its size in proportion to the total population will continue to shrink. It 
is already estimated that more than 50% of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin,263 so a 
large influx of Syrian refugees would certainly turn the East Banker population into a smaller 
minority than the significant minority it is estimated to be without considering the Syrian 
population. Nevertheless, even if Jordan maintains its policies of non-integration, this would not 
make this demographic challenge suddenly disappear—the Syrian refugees are still residing in 
Jordan and can still influence politics in spite of their political and economic disenfranchisement, 
especially if they mobilize collectively.  
The Jordanian government’s choice to depend on protracted international humanitarian aid 
and increased resettlement while barring Syrian refugees from both civil and political as well as 
economic and social rights has not produced true global responsibility sharing, despite its 
intentions to encourage this, nor has it promoted conflict resolution back in Syria. Sadly, the 
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people most impacted by this policy have been the Syrian refugees in Jordan, who are living in 
limbo, waiting for the Jordanian government and the international community gather the political 
will to adequately respond to the Syrian refugee crisis and the protracted war in Syria. It is 
indisputable that Jordan needs much more support and increased development assistance to 
handle the strains of hosting such a large population of Syrian refugees. However, this need for 
additional assistance does not negate the rights to which Syrian refugees are entitled nor the 
moral imperative to solve the crisis.  
Given the protracted nature of the crisis in Syria and the Syrian refugee crisis, as well as the 
ways in which the international community has responded, Jordan should prioritize full 
integration and a pathway to citizenship for the Syrian refugees residing within its borders. 
Regardless of how Jordan chooses to respond to this crisis, it is clear that the overwhelming 
majority of Syrian refugees will not be resettlement, and that, given the protracted nature of the 
war in Syria, they cannot safely return home. Protracted responsibility sharing and humanitarian 
assistance may seem appealing at first, but ultimately it is expensive and unsustainable for the 
international community, it has the potential to threaten national security, and, perhaps most 
importantly, it denies Syrian refugees the fulfillment of their basic human rights to live in dignity 
and with the agency to determine their own fate. As the protracted nature of the cases of refugees 
in Dadaab and Kakuma, Kenya (over 20 years) as well as the case of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon (since 1948), this is not a solution. As Aleinikoff and Poellot compellingly articulate, 
there is a “responsibility to solve” protracted refugee crises.264 The Syrian refugee crisis and the 
situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan are no exception. 
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We have the means and the capacity to deal with our problems, if only we can find the political will.265 
 
-- Kofi Annan, 2015 
 
The Syrian refugee crisis is a highly complex issue resulting from an even more complex and 
protracted crisis inside Syria. No one proposed solution can truly be a silver bullet that can fix 
everything. Even if the war in Syria were to end tomorrow, many Syrian refugees cannot return 
and many no longer wish to return either way. And even if countries around the world actually 
took on more responsibility and pledged to take in more Syrian refugees and to fully fund the 
humanitarian and development sectors working with Syrian refugee populations, this still will 
not account for the overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees residing in neighboring host 
countries who cannot return to Syria and will not be resettled elsewhere. Even the proposed 
solution in this thesis of local integration and a pathway to citizenship for Syrian refugees in 
Jordan will not fully solve the issue for the Syrian refugees in Jordan, as many do just want to 
return home, some want to be resettled elsewhere, some just want to be reunified with family 
members wherever they are, some are still waiting it out to see what their best options will be, 
and some have already given up entirely on any hope of a solution.  
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Nevertheless, should Jordan be more open to integration and a pathway to citizenship for 
Syrian refugees, this option will surely ameliorate some of the challenges that the Syrian 
refugees in Jordan currently face as well as some of the resulting challenges that Jordanian 
nationals and organizations working with Syrian refugees or both Syrians and Jordanians 
currently face. Overall, this policy option is in Jordan’s long-term interests and it will certainly 
improve the situation of the Syrian refugees in Jordan and Jordanian nationals who have been 
negatively impacted by the impacts of Syrians working illegally and under the table in informal 
markets.  
However, for this to succeed, there are several hurdles that must be overcome. The first 
major hurdle is social and political, or perhaps even cultural. The concept of citizenship is 
understood differently throughout the world. In United States, concept of citizenship is based on 
a jus solis system, wherein anyone born in the U.S. is automatically a U.S. citizen. Furthermore, 
there is a long history of naturalization and pathways to citizenship in the U.S. Specifically for 
refugees and asylum seekers, once an individual refugee is resettled to the U.S. or an asylum 
seeker in the U.S. attains asylum status, he or she is automatically placed on a pathway to 
citizenship and can apply for citizenship after five years, assuming that he or she has adhered to 
the law and has done nothing to jeopardize their immigration status. In Jordan on the other hand, 
citizenship is based on a jus sanguinis system wherein a person is a Jordanian citizen if he or she 
is born to a Jordanian father. There is no real concept of a pathway to citizenship in Jordan, with 
the notable exception of the forced naturalization of Palestinians after Jordan annexed the West 
Bank following the 1948 war against Israel. Many Jordanians, especially in areas like Al Mafraq 
that have been almost entirely “East Banker” Jordanian (with few Palestinians), deeply oppose 
any idea to integrate the Syrian refugees and fear that they might stay forever like the Palestinian 
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refugees who were almost fully integrated and were given Jordanian citizenship. This same 
sector of Jordanian society still has not come to terms with the fact that Palestinians, or rather 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin, are Jordanian citizens. To an outsider, this may appear to be just 
nativist discrimination. However, this identity issue is further complicated by the fact that this 
“East Banker” population is the core and base of the Hashemite monarchy that ensures its 
continued legitimacy. Most public sector positions, whether in the government, the military, the 
mukhaberat, or other areas are occupied by “East Banker” Jordanians, many of whom still 
maintain this nativist mentality and narrow understanding of what it means to be a Jordanian 
citizen. Thus, to overcome this major sociopolitical obstacle, there must be a culture shift in 
Jordan away from such nativist and narrow understanding of what it means to be Jordanian. This 
is certainly the biggest obstacle and could prevent a solution like the one proposed in this 
research from ever materializing in Jordan. This would constitute a drastic and perhaps radical 
shift from the sociopolitical status quo. Further research will be required to determine how major 
this obstacle is and if and how it can be overcome. 
The second key obstacle is more tangible and far easier to overcome—increased and 
sustained international development support in order to ensure more even development and 
social cohesion within and between Jordanian communities. This international assistance will 
have to include both traditional development aid and increased foreign direct investment as well 
as smarter sustainable development programs aimed at addressing the major resource and 
environmental issues that Jordan faces such as water shortages, energy shortages when pipelines 
and sources are disrupted due to conflict and instability in neighboring or nearby states, and 
agricultural and food shortages resulting from the small amount of arable land in Jordan and the 
 Rachel Mayer      90
insufficient water supply. Further research will need to be done to find both short-term and long-
term solutions to this sustainable development challenges in Jordan.  
It is undeniable that the challenges to achieving policies aimed at local integration and a 
pathway to citizenship for Syrian refugees in Jordan are great. But from a human rights 
perspective as well as from an economic perspective and a security perspective, this option 
should not only be considered but should be highly prioritized. The social and political barriers 
will be difficult to overcome, and Jordan will need increased and sustained support from the 
international community for this proposal to have any chance at success. However, for the sake 
of the Syrian refugees in Jordan that fled the horrors in Syria only to find themselves in the 
temporary permanence of poverty, marginalization, isolation, lack of dignity, and hopelessness 
in Jordan, it is our duty to ensure that they can enjoy the same human rights to which all people 
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